Transsexualism and the Binary Divide:  Determining Sex Using Objective Criteria by Staver, Mathew
Page - 1 
 
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE: DETERMINING SEX USING 
OBJECTIVE RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA 
 
MATHEW D. STAVER
ABSTRACT: This article deals with the legal status of postoperative transsexuals in terms of marriage 
and sex-based classifications.   Until recently, sex has been assumed to be binary, i.e., male and female.  
Whether sex is immutable or transitory, objective or subjective, has now become an international concern. 
This article addresses every case in the world every decided on this issue. The resolution is centrally 
important to the battle over marriage and sex0based classifications.    
The thesis of this article is that sex is an immutable characteristic at the time of birth and must be 
determined by objective criteria. 
Sex must be determined by objective factors such as biology and physiology.  A person’s sex is determined 
by chromosomes. When there is harmony between biology and physiology, surgery cannot alter a person’s 
sex merely because that person desires a different gender.  If sex is primarily a state of mind and based on 
subjective mental desires, equal protection for sex-based classifications becomes meaningless.  To maintain 
any stability and meaning to sex-based classification, sex must (and can) be determined by objective 
factors.    
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE: DETERMINING SEX USING 
OBJECTIVE CRITERIA 
 
Mathew D. Staver 
 
Table of Contents 
 
I. The Laws of the United States Regarding Same-Sex Marriage. …………………………………..4 
 
A. The Laws of the Several States Recognize Only Traditional Marriage. ............................5 
 B. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act Recognizes the States' Interest in Traditional  
 Male-Female Marriage......................................................................................................11 
II. Sex for Purposes of Marriage Must be Determined by Objective Biological  
 
 Founder and Chairman, Liberty Counsel; Interim Dean and Professor of Law, Liberty University School 
of Law; LL.D. (Liberty University) (hon0is causa); J.D. (University of Kentucky); M.A. (Andrews 
University); B.A. (Southern Missionary College). LL.D. (Liberty University).  
Page - 2 
 Rather than Subjective Psychological Criteria. ..............................................................................15 
 A. Sex is an Immutable Characteristic Determined at the Time of Birth. ............................15 
 B. Sex Must be Determined by Objective Criteria. ..............................................................16 
 1. The Laws of the Several States do not Recognize Sex-Change Surgery to  
 Alter Sex for the Purpose of Marriage. .............................................................17 
 a. The Majority Rule. ............................................................................. 17 
 (1) Florida. ..................................................................................17 
 (2) Kansas. ..................................................................................19 
 (3) Ohio. ......................................................................................21 
 (4) Texas. ....................................................................................24 
 (5) New York. .............................................................................25 
 (6) Federal. ..................................................................................27 
 (7) Foreign Jurisdictions. ............................................................29 
 b. The Minority Rule. ..............................................................................34 
 (1) New Jersey.  ..........................................................................34 
 (2) Foreign Jurisdictions. ............................................................35 
III. Mutilating the Body's Internal Sex Organs and External Genitalia Does Not  
 Change a Person's Sex. …………………………………………………………………………...37 
 A. Chromosomes Determine Sex. ………………………………………………………….38 
 B. Biological Definition of Sex by Chromosome Testing is Both Possible and  
 Realistic………………………………………………………………………………….40 
 1. Surgically and Chemically Mutilating the Body to Alter Sexual Appearance 
 is Experimental and Controversial Medical Treatment. ………………………44 
 2. There are Many Mental Disorders Which are Either Permanent or Where  
 Surgery to Conform the Mind to the Body is Unethical. ……………………..51 
Conclusion  ………………………………………………………………………………………………...67 
Appendix A  ………………………………………………………………………………………………..69 
Appendix B ………………………………………………………………………………………………...75 
Page - 3 
TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE: DETERMINING SEX USING 
OBJECTIVE RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA 
 
By 
Mathew D. Staver1
In 1965, when Jewell Akens debuted the hit song, The Birds and the Bees, the 
American pop culture gave no second thought to the lyric “a girl and a guy.” 
Differentiating between a man and a woman, and the natural attraction to the opposite 
sex, seemed simple enough. However, in 1969, Johns Hopkins University opened the 
nation’s first clinic to perform so-called sex reassignment surgery (hereinafter “SRS”) on 
males wanting to be females and females wanting to be males.2 When a follow-up study 
of transsexuals treated by the clinic severally criticized the legitimacy of SRS,3 the 
program was immediately shut down, and other university-sponsored clinics followed 
suit like dominos.4 Now, due to the emergence of private clinics performing SRS, a 
 
1 Mathew D. Staver, B.A. 1980, Southern Missionary College, M.A. 1982, Andrews University, J.D. 1987, 
University of Kentucky, LL.D. 2006 (honoris causa), Liberty University, is Founder and Chairman of 
Liberty Counsel, a public interest litigation, education and policy organization. He is also Interim Dean and 
Professor of Law of Liberty University School of Law, and is Vice President of Law and Policy for Liberty 
University. Staver was lead counsel on the internationally publicized case known as Kantaras v. Kantaras,
884 So.2d 155 (Fla. App.) reh’g denied (2004), review denied (Fla. 2005), which dealt with the 
determination of a person’s sex for purposes of marriage. 
2 Richard Green & John Money, TRANSSEXUALISM & SEX REASSIGNMENT (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1969). 
3 See Jon K. Meyer, M.D. et al., Sex Reassignment: Follow-up, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1015 (1979). 
Dr. Meyer served as the Director of the Gender Identity Clinic and Chair of the Gender Identity Committee 
at Johns Hopkins University, where he developed his research interests in gender and sexual identities. In 
June 2004, Dr. Meyer was elected to a two-year term as president of the American Psychoanalytic 
Association. 
4Ellen Makkai, The Sex-Change Charade, available at 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30442 (last visited June 29, 2006); see also 
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debate has emerged over whether postoperative transsexuals should legally be classified 
as their desired sex or their birth sex for purposes of marriage.5
The legal status of postoperative transsexuals for purposes of marriage is an 
extremely important issue for both marriage and sex-based classifications. If sex can be 
changed like clothes, then law defining marriage or granting protected status on account 
of sex will become meaningless. In addressing the legal status of postoperative 
transsexuals, section I of this article will begin by addressing the longstanding marriage 
laws in the United States which sanctions marriage only between one man and one 
woman. Section II will then discuss in some detail the medical issues involving sex and 
sexual disorders, and will also discuss whether sex should be defined biologically or 
psychologically for purposes of marriage. 
I.  THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE. 
 The United States Supreme Court has recognized traditional male-female 
marriage as “the foundation of the family and society, without which there would be 
 
Garrett Oppenheim, Hopkins Policy on Sex Change in Fog After Follow-Up Study, 11 TRANSITION 
(July/August/September 1979). 
5 The words “sex” and “gender” will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing.  Some transsexual 
advocates have attempted to differentiate between the two, arguing that “sex” refers more to biology and 
physiology and “gender” refers to the expression of maleness or femaleness.  See e.g., Julie  A. Greenberg, 
Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered 
Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (2002); Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a 
Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 725 (2000); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: 
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999); Mary Coombs, 
Sexual Disorientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 227-
28 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of 
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995). See also Rebecca Moskow, Broader Legal Implications 
of Transsexual Sex Determination Cases, U. CIN. L. REV. 1421 (2003). Such a distinction lacks merits. See 
David Lee Mundy, Hitting Below the Belt: Sexploitive Ideology and the Disaggregation of Sex and Gender,
14 REGENT U. L. REV. 215 (2001); Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and Female in 
Marriage Statutes, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 349 (2005).  
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neither civilization nor progress.”6 Justice Holmes observed that “some form of 
permanent association between the sexes” is one of the rudimentary characteristics of 
civilization.7 The “structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of 
marriage [which is founded upon the] joining of the man and woman....”8 In “every 
enlightened government”, marriage “is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, and 
thus an object of the deepest public concern.” 
A.  The Laws Of The Several States Recognize Only Traditional Marriage. 
 No state has legislatively authorized same-sex marriage.9 In addition to the general 
laws and longstanding public policy of the states and territories banning same-sex 
marriage, 41 states since 1996 have enacted specific Defense of Marriage Acts 
(hereinafter “DOMA”), expressly limiting marriage to one man and one woman.10 
6 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). The Supreme Court has said that “no legislation can be 
supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to 
take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of 
the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in 
the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best 
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political 
improvement.” Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885). 
7 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918). 
8 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976). 
9 On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the first court to sanction 
same-sex marriage. This decision was implemented 180 days later on May 17, 2004.  See Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
10 Ala. Code § 30-1-19; Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-101; Ark. Code § 9-11-107, 109 and 
208; Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-104; Del. Code tit. 13 § 101; Fla. Stat. § 741.212; Ga. 
Code § 19-3-3.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1, 1-3 and 1.6; Idaho Code § 32-209; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/212 
and 5/213.1; Ind. Code  § 31-11-1-1; Iowa Code § 595.2; Kan. Stat. § 23-101; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.020, 
040 and 045; La. Civ. Code Art. 86, 89, and 3520; La. Rev. Stat. § 9:272, 273 and 275; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 
19-A § 701; Md. Code Fam. § 2-201; Mich. Comp. Laws § 555.1 and .271; Minn. Stat. § 517.01 and .03; 
Miss. Code § 93-1.1; Mo. Ann. Stat. Const. art. § 33; Mo. Rev. Stat. §  451.022; Mont. Code  § 40-1-401; 
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1-2; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-01; Ohio Rev. Code § 
3101.01; Okla. Stat. tit. 43 § 3.1; 23 Pa. Const. Stat. § 1102 and 1704; S.C. Code § 20-1-15; S.D. Codified 
Laws § 25-1-1and 1-38; Tenn. Code § 36-3-113; Tex. Fam. Code § 2.001; Utah Code § 30-1-2; Va. Code § 
20-45.2; Vt. Stat. 15 § 8; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010 and 020; W. Va. Code § 48-2-104 and 603; Wis. 
Stat. § 300; and Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101. No state legislatively recognizes same-sex marriage. The legislative 
schemes of the remaining states not listed above also limit marriage to one man and one woman.  In 1996, 
states began passing Defense of Marriage Acts, which expressly ban same-sex marriage.  In addition, some 
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Hawaii in 1998 amended its constitution to provide that marriage is the sole province of 
the legislative branch.11 Referenda by Alaska (1998),  Hawaii (1998), Nebraska (2000), 
Nevada (2002), Missouri (2004), Louisiana (2004), Oregon (2004), Kentucky (2004), 
Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Georgia (2004), North Dakota (2004), Ohio (2004), 
Oklahoma (2004), Arkansas (2004), Montana (2004), Utah (2004), Kansas (2005), Texas 
(2005), and Alabama (2006) banned same-sex marriage.12 Although Vermont does not 
have a so-called DOMA, its statutory scheme limits marriage to one man and one 
woman.13 Several statutes only focus on incestuous marriages.14 A few merely discuss 
 
of the above states have also amended their constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, while other states have 
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage without a corresponding statutory ban. An example of such a 
state is Nebraska.  See Neb. Const. art. I, § 29. 
11 See Haw. Const. art. 1, § 23. The referendum was in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision 
which stated that a ban on same-sex marriage must survive strict scrutiny under the Hawaii constitution.  
See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration 
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).  Following the referendum, the legislature declared that 
marriage is limited to one man and one woman. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (marriage is “only between a 
man and a woman”).  
12 See Alaska Const. art. 1 § 25; Haw. Const. Art. 1 § 23; Neb. Const. art. I, § 29; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 21; 
Mo. Ann. Stat. Const. art. § 33; La. Const. art. 12 § 15; Or. Const. art. XV § 5a; Ky. Const. § 233A; Mich. 
Const. art. 1, § 25; Miss. Const. Art. 14, § 263A; Ga. Const. art. I, § 4, P I; N.D. Const. art. II, § 28; Ohio 
Const. art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const. art. II, 35; Ark. Const. Amend. 83 § 1; Mont. Const. Art. XIII § 7; Utah 
Const. art. I, § 29; Kan. Const. XV § 16; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32 and Ala. Code § 30-1-19(b).  The Alaska 
referendum was in response to the state court’s decision in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 
88743 (Super. Ct. Alaska), which held that a restriction on marriage must survive strict scrutiny under the 
Alaska constitution. The constitutional amendment overruled the Brause decision.  In six states, Florida, 
Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arizona, and Colorado, courts have held that proposed constitutional 
amendments defining marriage as “one man and one woman” do not violate the single-subject rule.  
Although not ruling on the single-subject rule, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state 
may proceed with a constitutional amendment defining marriage as “one man and one woman,” even if it 
requires overruling a decision by the state’s highest court.  See Schulman v. Attorney General, 447 Mass. 
189 (2006).  
13 Vermont  statutes provide for “civil marriage” for opposite-sex partners and “civil unions” for same-sex 
partners.  The statutes  expressly state that a “civil union” is not a “civil marriage.”  See Vt. Stat. tit. 15 § 8;  
Vt. Stat. tit. 15 § 1201(4) (The civil union law specifically states that while “a system of civil unions does 
not bestow the status of civil marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits Clause 
[under the Vermont Constitution].” Vt. H.B. §1(1)(10) (2000)).   
14 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-21 and 25; Mass. Gen. Laws 207 § 1-2; N.J. Stat. §37:1-1; N.M. Stat. § 
40-1-1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 5; Ohio Rev. Code § 3101.01; Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.010 and 020; R.I. Gen. 
Laws § 15-1-1. 
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marriage in general terms as a relationship between husband and wife or male and 
female.15 
In addition to the overwhelming statutory authority, a number of state courts, even 
in the absence of an express statute, have rejected same-sex marriage.16 In 2004, a Florida 
 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 765.01 (husband and wife); Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101 (male and female).  
16 See e.g., Alabama: In re: H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (“homosexual conduct of a parent – 
conduct involving a sexual relationship between two persons of the same gender – creates a strong 
presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or her 
own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of others”) (Moore, J. concurring); Alaska: Brause,
1998 WL 88743 (overruled by constitutional amendment); Arizona: Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel 
County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003); Arkansas: May v. Daniels, 2004 WL 2250882 (Ark.); 
California: Smelt v. County of Orange, California, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Colorado: Adams v. 
Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (male America citizen and male 
Australian alien who had been ceremonially “married” by a minister in Colorado does not qualify alien as 
citizen’s spouse); Connecticut: Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. granted in 
part but dismissing case as moot upon death of the party, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002) (a Vermont civil 
union is not “marriage” recognized under this state because the union was not entered into between one 
man and one woman); Kerrigan v. State, 2006 WL 2089468 (Conn. Super. 2006); Delaware: no cases; 
District of Columbia: Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (marriage statute prohibited 
clerk from issuing license to same-sex couple and same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right protected 
by the Due Process Clause); Florida: Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 759, 760 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 2001), rev. denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002) (classifications based on sex are not subject to strict 
scrutiny, noting that the Constitution Revision Commission refused to add the term “sex” to the Florida 
constitution so as to avoid any possibility that Florida courts might conclude the provision required 
recognition of same-sex marriages); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. App.) reh’g denied (2004), 
review denied (Fla. 2005), (rejecting transsexual marriage based on Florida DOMA which bans same-sex 
marriage); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Georgia: Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 
(Ga. App.), reconsideration denied, cert. denied (2002) (a Vermont civil union is not marriage, and even if 
it were, Georgia would not recognize it as such, because the state authorizes only the union of one man and 
one woman and prohibits same-sex marriage); Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), aff’d,
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (authorizing strict scrutiny for marriage classifications but decision was 
overruled by constitutional referendum); Idaho: no cases; Illinois: In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 206 
(Ill. App. 1998) (challenge to statute proscribing same-sex marriage was moot and petitioner was never 
legally married – “We cannot retroactively redefine petitioner and Hall’s relationship as a lawful marriage 
or even confer the benefits of a legal marriage upon the relationship.  If we did, we would essentially be 
resurrecting common law marriage . . .”; Indiana: Morrison v. Sadler, 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. Super. Ct.), 
cert. denied, (dismissing challenge to Indiana’s DOMA which limits marriage to one man and one woman); 
Iowa: no cases; Kansas: In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) (a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the statutes recognizing marriage, and thus a 
marriage of a male-to-female transsexual to another male is void); Kentucky: Jones v. Hallahan, 501 
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (a same-sex union is not recognized as marriage); Louisiana: no cases; Maine; no 
cases; Maryland: no cases; Massachusetts: Albano v. Attorney General, 769 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 2002) 
(initiative for constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage permissible);  Goodrich v. Department 
of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (first court to sanction same-sex marriage); 
Michigan: no cases; Minnesota: Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186, 187 (Minn. 1971) (upholding 
statute which authorizes marriage between persons of the same sex, stating “The institution of marriage as a 
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as 
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court of appeals voided the “marriage” of a postoperative transsexual.17 The Kansas 
Supreme Court in 2002 also voided the “marriage” of a man with a male-to-female 
transsexual.18 Viewing “the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not of fact” and 
noting that the “fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 
legislature governs”, the court invalidated the transsexual “marriage.”19 
old as the book of Genesis” and recognizing “there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based 
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”); Mississippi: no cases; Missouri:
no cases; Montana: no cases; Nebraska: Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006 WL 1933417 (8th 
Cir. 2006), ; Nevada: no cases; New Hampshire: no cases; New Jersey: M.T. v. J.T. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 
App. 1976) (male transsexual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery may not be considered female for 
marital purposes); In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. App. 2001) (change of name to include last name 
of same-sex partner was not for an inappropriate purpose); New Mexico: no cases; New York: Anonymous 
v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y App. Div. 1971) (a marriage between two males was a nullity 
notwithstanding that “husband” believed “wife” was a female at the time of the ceremony, and 
notwithstanding that “she” had subsequent sex surgery); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1996) (“same-sex marriage . . . is not presently recognized under the laws of any state of the Union”, 
the “long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male and female, testifies to a contrary political, 
cultural, religious and legal consensus [opposed to same-sex marriage] concluding that New York does not 
recognize or authorize same-sex marriage and that the City Clerk correctly refused to issue the license.”); 
In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (“the state has a compelling interest in 
fostering the traditional institution of marriage ( whether based on self-preservation, procreation, or 
nurturing and keeping alive the concept of marriage and family as a basic fabric of our society), as old and 
as fundamental as our entire civilization, which institution is deeply rooted and long established in firm and 
rich societal values” and thus same-sex marriage is not authorized); Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S. 2d 242 
(N.Y.A.D. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, Samuels v. New York, Kane v. Marsolais and, Seymour v. Holcomb 
(consolidated) 2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. 2006) North Carolina: no cases; North Dakota: no cases; Ohio: In 
re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002) (cohabiting same-sex partner of biological mother was not a 
“parent”); In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.) (refusing to recognize transsexual marriage based 
on statute that authorizes only opposite-sex marriage); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Probate Court 1987) 
(“There is no authority in Ohio for the issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a 
post-operative male-to-female transsexual person and a male person”); Oklahoma: no cases; Oregon: Li v. 
Oregon, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Pennsylvania: De Santo v. Barnsly, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) 
(two persons of the same sex cannot contract a common-law marriage); Rhode Island: no cases; South
Carolina: no cases; South Dakota: no cases; Tennessee: no cases; Texas: Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 
(Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 870 (2000) (ceremonial “marriage” between a man and a 
transsexual born as a man, who was surgically and chemically altered to have the physical characteristics of 
a woman, is not valid); Utah: no cases; Vermont: Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that 
while the Vermont constitution requires that same-sex couples be afforded the same benefits of traditional 
marriage, the constitution does not require the state to issue a same-sex marriage license); Virginia: no 
cases; Washington: Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. App. 1974) (statutory prohibition of same-
sex marriage does not violate state constitution); Anderson v. King County and Castle v. State of 
Washington (consolidated for decision), 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. 2004).  
17 Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155. 
18 See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120. 
19 Id. at 135. 
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 Rejecting same-sex marriage, a Kentucky court noted that marriage “was a 
custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose,” noting that 
“marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. . . .”20 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that its statute, which bans same-sex marriage, did not 
offend the First, Eighth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, holding that “there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based 
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”21 A New York 
court noted that the state “law makes no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of 
the same sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman.”22 
“Accordingly, the court declares that the so-called marriage ceremony in which the 
plaintiff and defendant took part . . . did not in fact or in law create a marriage contract in 
that the plaintiff and defendant are not and have not ever been ‘husband and wife’ or 
parties to a valid marriage.”23 
A Texas court refused to recognize the “marriage” of a man and a transsexual 
born as a man who surgically and chemically altered his physical characteristics to that of 
a woman.24 Rejecting the transsexual’s claim to a marriage license, the court noted that in 
“our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine 
what guidelines should govern the recognition of marriages involving transsexuals.”25 
“[T]his court has no authority to fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else. We 
cannot make law when no law exists: we can only interpret the written word of our sister 
 
20 Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589. 
21 Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
22 Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500. 
23 Id. at 501. 
24 See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223. 
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branch of government, the legislature.”26 The court therefore held “as a matter of law, 
that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male.”27 
An Ohio court similarly denied the issuance of a marriage license to a transsexual.28 
Noting that the marriage license law required that an applicant should not misrepresent 
any of the facts required for the license, the court observed the following: It is axiomatic 
that if a license is inadvertently issued where there has been a material misrepresentation 
of factual information, such as sex, marital status, or age, then such license would be 
void.29 
A Washington court found that marriage was permissible only between one man 
and one woman.30 The court held that the same-sex couple was “not being denied entry 
into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry 
into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as 
one which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite 
sex.”31 Refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry is not based upon their same-sex 
status, but rather it is based upon the state’s recognition that our society as a whole views 
marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of 
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to become parents 
even though some couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though not all 
couples who produce children are married.  These, however, are exceptional situations.  
 
25 Id. at 230. 
26 Id.
27 Id. at 231. 
28 See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 828. The holding in Ladrach was reaffirmed by another Ohio court in 
2003. See In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095. 
29 Id. at 831. The applicant was refused a marriage license after advising the clerk that “she” had been 
married two previous times to females.   
30 See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191. 
31 Id. at 1192. 
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The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of 
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.32 
Therefore, defining “marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex 
relationships is not to create an inherently suspect legislative classification . . .”33 
Although some may contend that “other cultures may have fostered differing definitions 
of marriage, marriage in this state, as elsewhere in the nation, has been deemed a private 
relationship of a man and a woman (husband and wife) which involves ‘interests of basic 
importance to our society.’”34 “[T]he state has exclusive dominion over the legal 
institution of marriage [and the] societal values which are involved in this area must be 
left to the examination of the legislature. . . .[Indeed, traditional] “marriage is now 
defined as deeply rooted in our society.”35 
B. The Federal Defense Of Marriage Act Recognizes The States’ Interest                             
In Traditional Male-Female Marriage.
In response to the failed attempt in Hawaii to judicially recognize same-sex 
marriage, Congress passed what is known as the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.36 The 
Federal DOMA is designed to permit each state to set its own marriage policy and thus is 
designed to afford a state the right to refuse full faith and credit to any out-of-state same-
sex union. Effective September 21, 1996, the law reads as follows: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding 
of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
 
32 Id. at 1195. 
33 Id. at 1196. 
34 Id. at 1173 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)). 
35 Id.
36 See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense 
of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998) (hereafter  "Original Understanding").  
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between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the 
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or right or claim 
arising from such relationship.37 
“Congress was intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the 
Effects Clause” of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.38 The Full Faith and Credit Clause in 
Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution, states the following: Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effects 
thereof.39 
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Constitution gives the Congress the 
power to determine the “effects” of an act, record, or judicial proceeding of another state.  
During the Constitutional Convention the “effects clause” became the subject of 
controversy.  The issue was whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause would include the 
power to govern the effects not only of state court judgments, but also of the legislative 
acts of the states.40 Justice Joseph Story noted in his commentary that the “effects” are 
“expressly subjected to the legislative power.”41 
The First Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act to “prescribe the mode 
in which the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings in each State, shall be 
authenticated so as to take effect in every other state.”42 Today the Full Faith and Credit 
 
37 28 U.S.C. §1738C. 
38 Whitten, Original Understanding, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 392. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
40 See Max Farrand ed., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 488 (1911) (statement of 
William Samuel Johnson, September 3, 1787). 
41 Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 661 (1833) (Ronald D. 
Rotunda & John E. Nowak, eds. 1987). 
42 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. 
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Act remains essentially unchanged and states the following: “Such Acts, Records and 
judicial Proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and 
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they 
are taken.”43 
Pursuant to authority granted by the Constitution to determine the “effects” of 
acts, records, or judicial proceedings in another state, Congress passed the Federal 
DOMA. 
Prima facie, every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own 
statutes, lawfully enacted.  One who challenges that right, because of the 
force given to a conflicting statute or another state by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, 
that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are 
superior to those of the forum.  It follows that not every statute of another 
state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.  . . .44 
One commentator stated that the historical evidence “makes it clear that the first sentence 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be interpreted to contain broad choice of 
law commands to the states.”45 Professor Whitten argues that “the evidence is compelling 
that Congress was intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the 
Effects Clause” and the historical evidence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicates 
 
43 28 U.S.C. §1738. 
44 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 323, 547-48.  See also Sun Oil Co. 
v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel one state to substitute 
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with subject matter within which it is competent to 
legislate); Jordan Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After 
Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OHIO STATE L. REV. 985, 991 n.25 (1995) (observing that in family law questions the 
United States Supreme Court seems to balance the forum state's public policy interests against the interests 
of comity).   
45 Whitten, Original Understanding, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 392. 
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that DOMA may not even be necessary, but is certainly within Congress's authority.46 In 
Baker v. General Motors Corp.,47 “the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
constitutionality as well as the continuing vitality of the public policy doctrine and choice 
of law.”48 Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause does 
not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing 
with the subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”49 Professor 
Hogue, commenting on Georgia law, stated that “[h]omosexual unions will likely be held 
violative of the state's public policy...”50 Recognizing that a number of states have 
adopted statutes prohibiting the recognition of same-sex unions, Professor Hogue noted 
that these “statutes will control in states which have them. In instances in which a state 
lacks a statute, the common law (through the public-policy exception) will continue to 
supply the appropriate rule.”51 The Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina,52 
noted that the “necessary accommodation between the right of one State to safeguard its 
interest in the family relation of its own people and the power of another state to grant 
divorces [or recognize marriage] can be left to neither State.”53 
Professor Hogue correctly notes that in “states which have adopted [same-sex] 
anti-recognition statutes,” the state courts will lack jurisdiction to adjudicate rights arising 
as a result of or in connection with out-of-state same-sex unions.54 Professor Lynn 
 
46 Id. 
47 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
48 L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will 
States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30 (1998). 
49 Baker, 522 U.S. at 232 (quotation and citations omitted). 
50 Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 30. 
51 Id. at 36-37. 
52 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945) (“Williams II”). 
53 Id. at 232. 
54 Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 42-43. 
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Wardle, who testified before Congress during the adoption of the Federal DOMA, stated 
the following: 
There is no serious doubt that Congress has the power to enact legislation 
defining the “effect” of one state's laws, records and judgments in other 
states.  Sentence two of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution  (Article IV, 1) explicitly provides that: “The Congress may 
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and 
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”  The Congressional 
Research Service of the Library of Congress has stated: Congress has the 
power under the Clause to decree the effect that the statutes of one State 
shall have in other States.” A host of scholarly authority for many decades 
concurs with this assessment.55 
Congress has a “substantial interest” in “balancing the interests” of the several states by 
preventing one state's policy from dictating what the legal policy of other states will be.56 
Even Professor Mark Strasser, who is an advocate of same-sex marriage, has conceded 
the following: 
Both the First and Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws suggest that a 
marriage which would be treated as void in the domicile at the time of the 
marriage need not be recognized, notwithstanding its being valid in the 
state of celebration. Section 132(d) of the Restatement (First) of Conflict 
of Laws suggests that a “marriage which is against the law of the state of 
domicile of either party, though the requirements of the law of the state of 
celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere” if it 
involves a “marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicile 
makes void even though celebrated in another state.”  The Second 
Restatement suggests a similar policy, as a marriage need not be 
recognized if “it violates the strong public policy of ... [the] state which 
had the most significant relationship to the spouses in the marriage at the 
time of the marriage.”57 
The Supreme Court has explained that “marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or 
otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the State where entered 
 
55 Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage 
Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 223 (1998). 
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into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.”58 One state does not have to 
recognize an out-of-state same-sex union or same-sex marriage recognized by another 
jurisdiction if (1) the out-of-state union is contrary to the state's public policy or (2) the 
out-of-state union is prohibited by the domicile state's statute and the domicile state has 
the jurisdiction to enact its own legislation on the matter. 
 The Federal DOMA evinces a strong nationwide policy of promoting marriage 
between one man and one woman. The longstanding public policy from the founding of 
this country to the present has restricted marriage to only one man and one woman. The 
Federal DOMA is designed to protect state sovereignty with respect to setting marriage 
policy by allowing states to refuse recognition to any out-of-state same-sex union. The 
real question the courts must now address is what constitutes a man and a woman for 
purposes of marriage?  The methodology used in answering this question must focus on 
objective, rather than subjective criteria. 
II.  SEX FOR PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE MUST BE DETERMINED BY 
OBJECTIVE BIOLOGICAL RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA. 
A.  Sex Is An Immutable Characteristic Determined At The Time Of Birth. 
 When “sex” was established as a suspect classification under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court anchored the class to the crucial similarity that it shares 
with race and national origin: immutability and determination at birth.  In Frontiero v. 
Richardson,59 the Court explained: 
 
56 See United States v. Edgebroad Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
57 Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457, 464 (1998). 
58 Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934). 
59 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special 
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex 
would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . .”60 
“Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic....”61 “Sex” is 
“the one acknowledged immutable difference between men and women. . . .”62 If one 
could change sex like changing clothes, every law designed to protect against sex 
discrimination becomes pointless.  In the eyes of the law, sex, like race, is and must be 
immutable and fixed at birth. 
B.  Sex Must Be Determined By Objective Criteria. 
 As with race and national origin, the law recognizes that a person’s sex is 
immutable and therefore it must be determined by objective rather than subjective 
criteria.  Rene  Descartes’ famous saying, “I think, therefore I am”, cannot mean that a 
person legally becomes who they think they are.  The law cannot condone a fill-in-the-
 
60 Id. at 686. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (same) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
61 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (emphasis added). 
62 City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 435 U.S. 702, 727 (1978) (Burger, J., Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The “capacity to become pregnant is the inherited and 
immutable characteristic that ‘primarily differentiates the female from the male.’” Bray v. Alexandria 
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court of 
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 466, 471 (1981) (upholding California statutory rape law and agreeing with 
“the immutable physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant.”); Kahn v. 
Shevin, 426 U.S. 351, 359, (1974) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting) (sex, like alienage or national 
origin is “immutable”); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review 
denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002) (“Physical differences between men and women, however, are 
enduring”). See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (close relatives “do not exhibit obvious, 
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 
(1985) (mentally disabled are “immutably” different);  Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (children of 
illegal aliens have no control over their status, unlike their parents); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 
(1976) (illegitimacy is like race or national origin because the status is not within the control of the 
illegitimate person). See also Dean v. District of Columbia, 656 A.2d 307, 349-40 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting 
Equal Protection challenge to law prohibiting same-sex marriage, stating characteristic of suspect class 
having “an immutable trait that is beyond a class member’s control” is not present with same-sex couples). 
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blank marriage policy (“I think, therefore I am [male/female]”).  Marriage has long been 
defined as the “Legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.”63 In the 
same way that Michael Jackson remains African-American in spite of surgery or skin 
bleaching, transsexuals cannot change their birth sex despite cosmetic surgery.  Any 
union other than the binary male and female model is not marriage. If someone can 
merely think they are African-American, the law cannot permit such a person to claim 
minority status. If sex is a “continuum” definable only by subjective mental ruminations, 
then most of our laws (and certainly equal protection) will have no meaning.64 
1. The laws of the several states do not recognize sex-
change surgery to alter sex for the purpose of marriage. 
 a.  The majority rule. 
The majority rule in America clearly holds that a transsexual may not marry 
someone of the same birth sex.  This majority rule has been historic international rule that 
began in Great Britain.  
(1)  Florida. 
 The Florida Court of Appeal voided the “marriage” between a 
postoperative female-to male transsexual and another female under the states marriage 
laws which recognize only the union of one man and one woman.65 The case involves 
Margo Kantaras who was born female in Ohio. In 1986, Margo moved to Texas and 
changed her name to “Michael”(hereafter “MK”), and in 1987 underwent SRS, which 
 
63 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th Ed.). 
64 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq.
(Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 to the Equal Opportunity in Education Act dealing with equal 
funding of female athletics). 
65 Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155. 
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involved testosterone treatments, a total hysterectomy and a double mastectomy.66 In 
1988, MK obtained a marriage license in Florida and “married” another female by the 
name of Linda, who at the time was aware of the SRS, and who also knew that MK still 
retained her female vagina.67 After Linda became a Christian and informed MK that their 
relationship was improper, MK  filed for divorce and sought custody of Linda’s two 
children. Linda filed a counter-petition claiming that the “marriage” was void under 
Florida law.68 Acknowledging that Florida law explicitly limits marriage to one man and 
one woman and bans same-sex marriage, the court stated the following: The controlling 
issue in this case is whether, as a matter of law, the Florida statutes governing marriage 
authorize a postoperative transsexual to marry in the reassigned sex. We conclude they do 
not.69 
The Kantaras court stated that the common meaning of “male and female . . . 
refer to immutable traits determined at birth.”70 The court deferred to the legislature, 
stating: 
Whether advances in medical science support a change in the meaning 
commonly attributed to the terms male and female as they are used in the 
Florida marriage statutes is a question that raises issues of public policy 
that should be addressed by the legislature. Thus, the question of whether 
a postoperative transsexual is authorized to marry a member of their birth 
sex is a matter for the Florida legislature and not the Florida courts to 
decide. Until the Florida legislature recognizes sex-reassignment 
procedures and amends the marriage statutes to clarify the marital rights of 
a postoperative transsexual person, we must adhere to the common 
meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate any marriage that is not 
 
66 Id. at 155. 
67 Id. at 155-56. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 161 
70 Id. 
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between persons of the opposite sex determined by their biological sex at 
birth. Therefore, we hold that the marriage in this case is void ab initio.71 
(2)  Kansas. 
 The Kansas Supreme Court found that a post-operative male-to-female 
transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the marriage statutes, and therefore, 
such “marriage” is void.72 Joseph M. Gardiner, III, in the probate proceeding of Marshall 
G. Gardiner, challenged the right of J’Noel Gardiner’s right to receive a spousal share of 
Marshall’s estate on the grounds that the marriage was fraudulent and void, because 
J’Noel remained a male and same-sex marriage in Kansas was barred by statute.73 After 
reviewing domestic and international case law74, the court observed the following: 
 [T]he essential difference between the line of cases, including Corbett and 
Littleton, that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage and the line of 
cases, including M.T. and In re Kevin, that would validate it is that the 
former treats a person’s sex as a matter of law and the latter treats a 
person’s sex as a matter of fact.75 
The court therefore stated, “We view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not 
fact. The resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of [Kansas Statutes]. The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court has unlimited appellate 
review.”76 The “fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the 
legislature governs.” The court continued: 
 
71 Id. 
72 See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
73 See Id. at 122-123.   
74 The English case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970) and the Texas case of Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000), refused to recognize the right of a 
transsexual to marry a person whose sex was that of the transsexual’s birth sex. The case of M.T. v. J.T.,
355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div.) cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976) and In re Kevin, Fam.C.A. 
1074 (File No. SY8136 Of. 1999, Family Court of Australia at Sydney),  ruled that a transsexual may 
marry a person of the transsexual’s birth sex. 
75 Id. at 132-33. 
76 Id. at 135. 
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The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” are words in common usage and 
understood by the general population.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th 
ed. 1999) defines “sex” as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and 
function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of 
being male or female.” Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary (2nd ed. 
1970) states the initial definition of sex as “either of the two divisions of 
organisms distinguished as male or female; males or females (especially 
men or women) collectively.” “Male” is defined as “designating or of the 
sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring; opposed to female.”
“Female” is defined as “designating or of the sex that produces ova and 
bears offspring; opposed to male.”[Emphasis added]. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 972 (6th ed. 1999), a marriage is the legal status, 
condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or 
until divorce, for the discharge to each other and the community of the 
duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the 
distinction of sex.”77 
After discussing the common understanding of the terms sex, male and female, the court 
continued: 
 The words “sex,” “male,” and “female,” in everyday understanding do not 
encompass transsexuals.  The plain, ordinary meaning of “persons of the 
opposite sex” contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and 
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.  A female-to-male 
post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of a female.  The 
male organs have been removed, but the ability to “produce ova and bear 
offspring” does not and never did exist.  There is no womb, cervix, or 
ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes.  As the Littleton 
court noted, the transsexual still “inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects 
other than what the physicians have supplied.”78 
Rejecting the argument that the absence of the word “transsexual” from the same-sex 
marriage statute made the statute vague, the court declared: “We view the legislative 
silence to indicate that transsexuals are not included. If the legislature intended to include 
transsexuals, it could have been a simple matter to have done so.”79 The court cited to 
 
77 Id.
78 Id. (citation omitted). 
79 Id. at 136. 
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Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,80 which reversed a federal district court that held that sex 
included not only chromosomes, but also psychological self-perception. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeal found that “to include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII 
far exceeds mere statutory interpretation.”81 Finding Ulane “well reasoned and logical”, 
the court held that the legislature clearly viewed “opposite sex” in the narrow traditional 
sense. . . .We cannot ignore what the legislature has declared to be the public policy of 
this state. Our responsibility is to interpret [the statute] and not to rewrite it. . . .If the 
legislature wishes to change public policy, it is free to do so; we are not. To conclude that 
J’Noel is of the opposite sex of Marshall would require that we rewrite [the Kansas 
Defense of Marriage Act].82 
Thus, “J’Noel remains a transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage under [the 
Kansas DOMA]. . . . [T]he validity of J’Noel’s marriage to Marshall is a question of 
public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by this court.”83 
(3)  Ohio. 
 Ohio does not allow a transsexual to obtain a marriage license to marry a person 
of the same gender as their birth sex. In the case of In re Nash,84 Pamela Nash was born 
female in Massachusetts. Nash later married a man and subsequently divorced, after 
which she relocated to Ohio.85 In Ohio  Nash changed her name to “Jacob Benjamin 
Nash.”86 Nash then applied to change her Massachusetts birth certificate to reflect a 
change in sex designation from female to male, and the  request was granted, so that the 
 
80 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
81 Id. at 1086. 
82 In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136-37. 
83 Id. at 137. 
84 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.). 
85 Id. at *1. 
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certificate included both the new name and male sex designation.87 Shortly thereafter, 
Nash obtained an Ohio driver’s license and applied for an Ohio  marriage license. During 
a search of the name, the clerk learned of Nash’s prior name change, and Nash was 
informed that the license would not be issued. In rejecting the transsexual marriage, the 
Nash court noted that  Ohio recognizes marriage only between members of the opposite 
sex.88 The court noted that “any change to Ohio’s public policy concerning transsexuals 
and marriage or expanding the definition of male and female . . . must come from the 
legislature.”89 The court concluded that “a marriage between a post-operative female-to-
male transsexual and a biological female is void as against public policy.”90 
In the case of In re Ladrach,91 another Ohio court found that a post-operative 
male-to-female transsexual was not permitted to marry a male. The case began with the 
filing of a petition for name change by Edward Franklin, who presented himself in female 
dress and explained that he intended to undergo a “transsexual surgery” later in the year. 
The applicant asked the court to change his name to Elaine Francis Ladrach, and since the 
statute allows name changes so long as there is no fraudulent intent to deceive creditors 
or others, the court granted the request.92 After the surgery, the applicant came to the 
courthouse with his “fiancé”, acknowledging on the application that he had been 
previously married twice to females. The clerk refused to issue the license and the 
applicant filed for declaratory relief, stating that he “considered himself a female and that 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at *5. 
89 Id. at *9. 
90 Id. 
91 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1987). 
92 Id. at 829. 
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he had undergone a ‘medical surgical procedure that resulted in the removal of the penis 
and testicles and the creation of a vagina.’”93 The court noted that it is “generally 
accepted that a person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the 
birth attendant.”94 The court then concluded “that there is no authority in Ohio for the 
issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative male-
to-female transsexual person and a male person.”95 The court then observed: 
The determination of a person’s sex in regard to his birth certificate and 
marital status are legal issues and, therefore, the court must look to the 
statutes. This court is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the 
statutes of this state and judicial interpretations of these statutes.  Since the 
case at bar is apparently one of first impression in Ohio, it is this court’s 
opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is to be the 
public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to post-
operative transsexuals.96 
93 Id. at 830. 
94 Id. at 832. 
95 Id.
96 Id. Two states recently enacted legislation that specifically prohibits changing sex or gender on birth 
certificates. See Idaho Code § 39-250; Tenn. Code § 68-3-203(d). A Florida Attorney General opinion 
states that “mandatory legislation is required in order to permit the State Registrar to amend birth 
certificates issued to individuals who have undergone sex-reassignment surgery,” that it is “irrelevant” 
whether an individual has allegedly undergone sex-reassignment surgery after birth, and concludes that the 
Florida State Registrar “is not authorized or empowered to amend birth certificates issued to individuals 
who have undergone sex reassignment surgery.” Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 076-213. Fla. Stat. § 382.016. A 
number of states through statutory enactments allow the birth certificate to be changed to reflect a different 
sex than is listed on the certificate.  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-9A-19; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-326; Ark. Code § 
20-18-307; Cal. Health & Safety § 103430; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-115; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-42; D.C. 
Code § 7-217; Ga. Code § 31-10-23; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 338-17-7; 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 535/17; Ind. Code 
§ 16-37-2-10; Iowa Code § 144.23; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 213.121; La. Rev. Stat. § 40:62; Md. Code § 4-214; 
Mass. Gen. Laws 46 § 13(e); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2831; Miss. Code § 41-57-21; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
193.215; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-604.1; N.J. Stat. § 26:8-40.12; N.M. Stat. § 24-14-25(D); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
130A-118(4); Or. Rev. Stat. § 432.235; Utah Code § 26-2-11; Va. Code § 32.1-269; Wis. Stat. § 
69.15(4)(b).  While not specified in the statute, several additional states allow for sex changes on the birth 
certificate through administrative procedures.  See, e.g.,  Kan. Admin. Reg. 28-17-20; Me. Admin. Reg. 10-
146 ch.2; Nev. Admin. Code ch. 440 § 130; Wash.  Rev. Code § 4.24.130.  The statutes of several states are 
vague and therefore it is unclear how these states handle a request to change sex on the birth certificate. See 
e.g., Del. Code tit. 16 § 3131; Minn. Stat.  § 144.218(4); Mont. Code  § 50-15-204; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 
126:23-a; N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 61 and 24; R.C.N.Y. Health  Code  § 207.01; N.D. Cent. Code § 23-
02.1-25; Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-321; 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 450.603; R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-3-21; S.C. Code § 
44-63-150; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-24-51; Tex. Health & Safety Code § 191-028; Vt. Stat. tit. 18 § 5075; 
W. Va. Code § 16-5-24; Wyo. Stat. § 35-1-424.  
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The court also noted that there was “no laboratory documentation that the 
applicant had other than male chromosomes” and therefore, the application “to 
obtain a marriage license as a female person is denied.”97 Although this case was 
published, the trial court never referenced this decision.  
(4)  Texas. 
 In Littleton v. Prange,98 the Texas court found that a ceremonial “marriage” 
between a man and a transsexual born as a man, who was later surgically and chemically 
altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman, was not valid and thus void. The 
court queried: “[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and 
counseling, or is a person’s gender immutably fixed by a Creator at birth?”99 The court 
began the discussion by observing the following: 
In our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose to do 
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of 
marriages involving transsexuals. . . .But this court has no authority to 
fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else.  We cannot make law 
when no law exists: we can only interpret the written word of our sister 
branch of government, the legislature.100 
The Texas court found that the matter presented a “pure question of law and must be 
decided by this court.”101 The court then observed that Christie was created and born a 
male and her original Texas birth certificate clearly so stated. The court acknowledged 
that Christie amended the original birth certificate to change the sex and name during the 
pendency of the suit, but then pointed out that the trial court’s role in considering the 
petition is merely a ministerial one, which involves no fact-finding.  “At the time of the 
 
97 Id.
98 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000). 
99 Id. at 224. 
100 Id. at 230. 
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birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically and genetically. The facts contained in the 
original birth certificate were true and accurate, and the words contained in the amended 
certificate are not binding on this court.”102 “There are some things we cannot will into 
being. They just are.”103 The court therefore held “as a matter of law, that Christie 
Littleton is a male.  As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male.  Her marriage 
to Jonathan was invalid, . . .”104 
(5)  New York. 
 New York will not recognize a transsexual “marriage.”105 In this case, the 
plaintiff was a man who sought a declaration to determine the validity of a “marriage” to 
another male “who appeared to be a female.”106 The two met at a house of prostitution 
where, although they spent a short time together, the plaintiff did not see the defendant 
unclothed or have any sexual relations. When the plaintiff, a non-commissioned officer in 
the United States Army, was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas, the defendant followed 
him. A few days later, the two took part in a marriage ceremony and they both returned to 
the plaintiff’s apartment.  Being intoxicated, the plaintiff fell asleep. He woke up early in 
the morning and reached for the defendant, and upon touching him, discovered that the 
defendant had male sexual organs. He immediately left the bed, “got drunk some more” 
and the next day, the defendant informed the plaintiff that he intended to undergo an 
operation to have the male organs removed.107 The parties continued to live together but 
never had any sexual relationship.  Later, the plaintiff was transferred overseas and 
 
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). 
106 Id.
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returned the next year. In the interim, the defendant sent numerous letters to the plaintiff 
along with medical bills for hospital and surgical expenses.  These expenses were paid 
for by the plaintiff. When the plaintiff returned from overseas to San Francisco, he 
arranged for the defendant’s release from jail on a prostitution charge, and the two later 
traveled to New York for the purpose of arranging a legal divorce or separation. The 
defendant told the plaintiff on this trip that he had completed a sex surgery and was now 
a “woman.”108 
The court found that the defendant was not a woman and that “mere removal of 
the male organs would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female.”109 The 
court observed that the “law makes no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of the 
same sex.  Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman.”110 
“Accordingly, the court declares that the so-called marriage ceremony in which the 
plaintiff and the defendant took part . . . did not in fact or in law create a marriage 
contract and that the plaintiff and defendant are not and have not ever been ‘husband and 
wife’ or parties to a valid marriage.”111 
In B. v. B.,112 the court reconfirmed the holding in Anonymous, finding that 
marriage is between one man and one woman.  The court quoted a surgeon who had 
performed more than 700 sex-reassignment surgeries: “I don’t change men into women.  
I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female aspect.  All the rest is in the 
 
107 Id.
108 Id. at 500. 
109 Id. 
110 Id.
111 Id. at 501.   
112 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
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patient’s mind.”113 Finding that the female who underwent sex reassignment surgery to 
be “male” “does not possess a normal penis, and in fact does not have a penis” and in the 
same way that surgery cannot provide a man “with something resembling a normal 
female sexual organ, transplanting ovaries or a womb”, the court voided the marriage.114 
(6)  Federal. 
 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,115 found 
that a male-to-female transsexual is not covered by Title VII. In Ulane, a male pilot 
working for Eastern Airlines underwent sex-reassignment surgery, revised his birth 
certificate and the FAA certified him as a “female.” Ulane’s own physician, however, 
explained “that the operation would not create a biological female in the sense that Ulane 
would ‘have a uterus and ovaries and be able to bear babies.’”116 Holding that Title VII 
“does not protect transsexuals,” the court rejected the district judge who wrote that sex 
was more than chromosomes and should include psychological and self-perception 
components. To the contrary, the appellate court stated that its responsibility was “to 
interpret this congressional legislation and determine what Congress intended when it 
decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.”117 Beginning with the “maximum of 
statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words should be given their 
ordinary, common meaning,” the court found that Title VII banned discrimination based 
 
113 Id. at 717 (citation omitted). 
114 Id. In Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) and in Hartin v. Director of the 
Bureau of Records and Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), the courts upheld the Board of 
Health’s rules that refuse to allow sex to be changed on birth certificates.  One court noted the Board of 
Health’s findings that “surgery for the transsexual is an experimental form of psychotherapy by which 
mutilating surgery is conducted on a person with the intent of setting his mind at ease, and that nonetheless, 
does not change the body cells governing sexuality.  In the words of one of the medical members of the 
Board, ‘I would think that it would be unsound, if, in fact, there were encouragement to the broader use of 
this means of resolving a person’s unhappy mental state’.” Hartin, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 518.  
115 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
116 Id. at 1083. 
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on “sex”, which “implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they 
are women and against men because they are men.”118 A “prohibition against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against 
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex 
into which they were born.”119 “In our view, to include transsexuals within the reach of 
Title VII far exceeds mere statutory interpretation.  Congress had a narrow view of sex in 
mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act, . . .” 120 To hold that Title VII protects 
transsexuals “would take us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing into the realm 
of legislating.”121 
(7)  Foreign Jurisdictions. 
 While briefly overviewing international law, we should remember the admonition 
by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas that courts “should not impose foreign 
 
117 Id. at 1084. 
118 Id. at 1085. 
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1086. 
121 Id. Other federal courts have similarly found that Title VII does not protect transsexuals.  See Mario v. 
P& C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Ulane and Sommers and stating it is 
unclear whether transsexuals are protected Title VII); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that transsexuals are not a protected class, but noting that this legal question may need to be 
reevaluated); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 749 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & 
Co., 566 F.2d 659, 663-64 (9th Cir. 1977); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 
31098541, at *6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002); Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp.2d 706, 714 (E.D. Texas 
2000); Rentos v. Oce-Office Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 
1996); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. (AMTRAK), 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1993); 
Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Minn. 1981); Terry v. EEOC, No. Civ.A.80-C-408, 1980 WL 
334, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31, 638, at *19, 732-33 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 
369, 371 (D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 
aff’d mem., 570 F. Supp. 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Grossman v. Board of Educ., No. 74-1904, 1975 WL 302, at 
*4, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196, 1199 (D. N.J. 1975), aff’d mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 897 (1976). But see, Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(erroneously stating that the loose use of the terms “sex” and “gender” in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 240 (1989), overrules Holloway and similar cases which recognized that Congress intended “sex” 
to encompass only the plain meaning of  male and female, which is also indicated by several bills 
introduced later attempting to extend the scope of Title VII discrimination). 
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moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”122 “[I]t is American conceptions of decency that 
are dispositive, . . .”123 It is irrelevant how other countries interpret their laws. However, a 
discussion of the international cases is presented here briefly only because the trial court 
strayed into these muddy waters. What is to prevent one court from relying on the 
marriage laws of Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan to support bigamy or to exclude women 
from power and reduce them to property? One indictment against the King of Great 
Britain in the Declaration of Independence stated: “He has combined with others to 
subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; 
giving his Assent to their pretended Legislation.”124 We must not forget that important 
part of American history, namely the American Revolution.  If we learn anything at all 
from the international cases, we should only note with a nod that the country which most 
parallels our common law system is Great Britain, and the historical interpretation by 
these courts have concluded that sex must be determined biologically and that a 
transsexual may not marry a person whose sex is the same as the transsexual’s sex at 
birth.   
 The first reported transsexual case in the world is Corbett v. Corbett,125 Corbett 
involved a person whose sex at birth was male, but who later underwent an operation to 
remove his testicles and most of the scrotum, along with an incision to create an artificial 
“vagina.” Arthur Corbett met this transsexual who presented himself as a woman and the 
two married.  After the marriage, Mr. Corbett learned that his “wife” was actually a man. 
He filed for divorce, asking the court to declare the “marriage”  null and void.  After 
 
122 Foster v. Florida, 123 S.Ct. 470 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
123 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (plurality) (emphasis in original). 
124 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776, The Organic Laws of the United States of America. 
125 2 All. E.R. 33, 2 W.L.R. 1306 (Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Div. 1970). 
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listening to medical testimony, the court noted that there were several possible factors in 
determining a person’s sex, which included (1) chromosomes; (2) gonads (the presence 
or absence of testes or ovaries); (3) genitalia (including internal and external sex organs); 
(4) psychological; and (5) hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as 
the distribution of hair and physique). Discussing the inherent problems with hormonal 
and psychological factors, the court observed the following: 
Since marriage is essentially a relationship between man and woman, the 
validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my judgment, on whether 
the respondent is or is not a woman. . . . Having regard to this essentially 
heterosexual character of the relationship which is called marriage, the 
criteria must, in my judgment, be biological, for even the most extreme 
degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance 
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and 
male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of 
performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.  In other words, the 
law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors’ criteria, 
i.e., the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are 
congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and 
ignore any operative intervention. . . . My conclusion, therefore, is that the 
respondent is not a woman for the purposes of marriage but is a biological 
male and has been so since birth.  It follows that the so-called marriage of 
10th September 1963 is void. 
 
The court in Corbett recognized any other decision incorporating hormonal or 
biological factors would be fraught with insurmountable difficulties. The court pondered 
the following questions: 
If a law were to recognize the [sex surgery] “assignment” of the 
respondent to the female sex, the question which would have to be 
answered is, what was the respondent’s sex immediately before the 
operation?  If the answer is that it depends on ‘assignment’ then, if the 
decision at that time was female, the respondent would be a female with 
male sex organs and no female ones.  If the assignment to the female sex 
is made after the operation, then the operation has changed the sex.  From 
this it would follow that if a 50-year-old male transsexual, married and the 
father of children, underwent the operation, he would then have to be 
regarded in law as a female, and capable of ‘marrying’ a man!  The results 
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would be nothing if not bizarre. . . . Marriage is a relationship which 
depends on sex and not on gender. 
 
The holding in Corbett was reexamined and confirmed in England in the case of 
Bellinger v. Bellinger.126 Until recently, the European Court of Human Rights had 
routinely upheld England’s refusal to recognize the right of transsexuals to marry.127 
In W. v. W.,128 the court in South Africa followed the decision in Corbett. The 
court found a transsexual marriage to be invalid and stated that the “evidence does not 
show that the operation converted her into a female. What it did was to artificially supply 
her with certain of the attributes of a woman, namely, breasts and a vagina-like cavity. . . 
. Imitation cannot be equated with actual transformation.” The court noted that in order to 
recognize the right of a transsexual to marry, “intervention of the legislature would be 
necessary.”129 Several Canadian courts have also followed the reasoning in Corbett.
126 (2001) E.W.C.A. Civ. 1140, (2002) Fam. 150 (C.A. 2001).  See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 86 (Md. App. 
2003).  However, on appeal, this case was overturned because of an intervening opinion by the European 
Court of Human Rights. See Bellinger v. Bellinger (2003) U.K.H.L. 21. The Bellinger decision was 
reversed because the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 
18 held that England’s Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 was incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
127 See Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 9 E.H.R.R. 56, Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 
and Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163. The European court reversed itself 
in Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18, in which the court held that the United Kingdom 
was in breach of Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights referred to by some 
courts as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
128 (1976) (2) S.A.L.R. 308. 
129 An English court of appeal in RV. Tan & Ors (1983) Q.B. 1053, followed Corbett in the context of a 
criminal sex offense, stating that the Corbett decision should apply not only for marriage but also for a 
charge brought under the Sexual Offenses Act. In the case of In re C. & D. (1979) 28 A.L.R.524, an 
Australian court considered the case of a hermaphrodite who was born with one testicle, one ovary, a 
uterus, breasts and a penis. This person also had a rudimentary vagina.  In an attempt to “correct” his 
anatomical anomalies, this person underwent a series of surgical operations, in the course of which his 
female attributes were removed.  He then married a female for a period of some five years, but he was not 
able to consummate the marriage. The wife sought a Decree of Nullity. The court found that in Australia, 
marriage is “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others” and was satisfied that on the 
evidence, the “husband was neither man nor woman but was a combination of both, and a marriage in the 
true sense of the word as within the definition referred to above could not have taken place and did not 
exist.” The marriage was therefore void. 
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 In B.V.A.,130 a Canadian court found that a female-to-male transsexual who had a 
20-year relationship with a female was not a “spouse” within the meaning of the Family 
Law Act.131 The court found that the transsexual who had undergone a hysterectomy, 
mastectomy and hormonal treatments, but had not yet received an artificially constructed 
penis, was not a “male” and would “revert” back to her female self once the hormone 
treatments ceased. 
 In C.(L.) v. C.(C.),132 an Ontario court concluded that the marriage between a 
female and a female-to-male post-operative transsexual was void ab initio. The court 
found that the transsexual had not received an artificially created penis and thus had not 
changed her sex.  In M. v. M.(A),133 another Canadian court considered a case involving 
two people who lived together for thirteen years, first as common-law and then as 
married persons. After they separated, the female spouse began to live as a man and 
started hormonal treatment, although no surgery had yet been performed. The husband 
received a Decree of Nullity, even though the attempted sex change occurred after the 
marriage dissolved. The court found that the wife had latent transsexual characteristics 
which prohibited her from being capable of being married to a male.134 
The Singapore courts have also followed the decision in Corbett. In Ying v. 
Eric,135 the court considered a female who underwent sex-reassignment surgery to 
become male, including a phalloplasty which involved the construction of an artificial 
 
130 (1990), 29 R.F.L. (3d) 258 (Ont. S.C. T.D.). 
131 See also Lori Johnson, The Legal Status of Post-Operative Transsexuals, 2 HEALTH L.J. 159, 166 
(1994). 
132 (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 254 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). 
133 (1984) 42 R.F.L. (2d) 55 (P.E.I. S.C.). 
134 See also Johnson, The Legal Status of Post-Operative Transsexuals, 2 HEALTH L.J. at 167.  
135 (1992) 1 S.L.R. 184. 
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“penis.”  The court noted that “since the respondent’s penis was artificial, erection for 
sexual intercourse was not possible.”  The court found that “one’s sex is fixed at the 
moment of conception” and that chromosomes should be the primary relevant factor in 
determining sex. The Singapore court considered relevant law and concluded as follows: 
It is desirable in the interests of certainty and consistency for the word 
‘man’ under the Charter to be given the ordinary meaning that is in 
contradistinction to woman.  A person biologically a female with an 
artificial penis, after surgery and psychologically a male, must, for 
purposes of contracting a monogamous marriage of one man and one 
woman, under the Charter be regarded as a ‘woman’. 
 
The court therefore declared the marriage to be a nullity and then concluded: “A person 
who has undergone a sex-change operation cannot be regarded as belonging to the sex for 
which reassignment surgery was undertaken for purposes of a monogamous marriage 
under the Charter.” 
b.   The minority rule. 
The minority rule, especially in America, includes a subjective psychological 
component to the definition of “sex” or “gender.” There is only one reported case in 
America that has followed this treacherous path, along with several international 
decisions.136 There are no such rulings internationally among common-law countries.  
(1)   New Jersey. 
 In M.T. v. J.T.,137 the court found that a female-to-male post-operative transsexual 
was permitted to marry a person of the sex of the transsexual at birth. The essence of the 
court’s decision was as follows: 
 
136 The Kansas Court of Appeals also embraced this minority rule. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 22 P. 3d 
1086 (Kan. App. 2001). However, this decision was reversed by the Kansas Supreme Court.  See In re 
Estate of Gardiner, 42 P3d at 120. The Kansas Supreme Court adopted the majority rule and  thus defined 
sex biologically rather than psychologically. 
137 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. App. 1976). 
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If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative 
transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full 
capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case may be, we 
perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in 
public policy to prevent the person’s identification at least for purposes of 
marriage to the sex finally indicated.138 
The court found that the transsexual had physiologically become a “female” and 
should be “considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes.”139 Then the 
court made the astonishing statement that such “recognition will promote the individual’s 
quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any societal 
interest, principle or public order or precept of morality.”140 The court’s decision is 
obviously shortsighted without any understanding of the far-reaching ramifications. 
There is certainly more at stake than a person’s “inner peace and personal happiness”; 
rather, there are many societal interests at stake. Every court of last resort in America has 
rejected the reasoning in the New Jersey decision. 
(2)   Foreign Jurisdictions. 
 An Australian Family Court found that a female with typical XX chromosomes, 
female genitalia and gonads, but who surgically removed these female organs, should be 
considered a “man” for purposes of Australia’s marriage law.141 Instead of focusing on 
birth to determine sex, the court focused instead on the time of marriage. Although 
acknowledging that a transsexual is to be distinguished from someone with Klinefelter’s 
Syndrome, hermaphroditism, and Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, the court 
nevertheless considered that surgical removal of female gonads and genitalia was 
 
138 Id. at 210-211. 
139 Id. at 211. 
140 Id.
141 In re Kevin (2002) 28 Fam.L.R. 158. 
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sufficient to transform a “female” into a “male.” However, this decision on appeal was 
set aside by the full court of the Federal Family Court on February 21, 2003.142 
In Secretary, Department of Social Security v. S.R.A.,143 a federal court in Sydney 
found that for purposes of the Social Security Act, the words “woman” and “female” 
included a post-operative male-to-female transsexual. The court noted that a person who 
was only “psychologically” female but who had not undergone sex surgery would not be 
considered a person of the desired sex.144 
In Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family Court,145 a New Zealand court found that 
for purposes of the New Zealand Marriage Act of 1955, where a person had undergone 
surgical and medical procedures, such a person could marry another, even though that 
other person was of the same birth sex as the transsexual. The court noted that the 
Marriage Act of 1955 did not “refer to man and woman or husband and wife” as a 
specific union, but the court nevertheless considered marriage to be the union of one man 
and one woman. In addressing where to draw the line, the court noted that in order “for a 
transsexual to be eligible to marry in the sex of assignment, the end of the continuum 
must have been reached and reconstructive surgery done. . . . [T]here must be as 
complete a transformation as is possible before that person can qualify as a person of his 
or her chosen sex for the purpose of marriage.”146 The court noted that a “preoperative 
transsexual” who dresses and behaves in the assigned sex may be accepted in that sex for 
 
142 In re Kevin, Appeal No. EA/97/2001(unreported). See also Bellinger v. Bellinger (2003) U.K.H.L. 21 at 
¶ 16. 
143 (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467. 
144 Other Australian courts have disagreed with one another. See In re C. & D. (1979) 28 A.L.R. 524 
(finding that sex reassignment surgery does not result in the acquisition of all the biological characteristics 
of the other sex, and therefore the marriage was void). 
145 (1995) 1 N.Z.L.R. 603. 
146 Id. at 615. 
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employment and social purposes, such as a driver’s license, but it would “not be 
appropriate for such a person whose genitals do not correspond with the sex of 
assignment to be able to marry in that sex.”147 The court realized that its reasoning was 
on somewhat shaky ground when it artificially drew the line for marriage by requiring the 
person to actually undergo sex surgery. Once a psychological component is considered, it 
is incongruent to force a person to undergo surgery, yet this court drew the line with a 
surgical scalpel.148 
Although the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, upheld on 
three separate occasions Great Britain’s right to deny a marriage license to a transsexual, 
the court has now receded from that position and found England’s position to be in 
contravention to Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 12 (right to marry) of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.149 
Ever since the first case in America to affirm transsexual marriage in 1976, every 
other court of last resort has refused to accept that a person’s sex can be changed for 
purposes of marriage. Sex must be determined by objective rather than subjective 
standards.  
 
147 Id. at 617. 
148 If a psychological component is considered important in determining a person’s sex, then one cannot 
easily argue that surgery is necessary to complete the so-called sex transformation. If a psychological 
component is accepted, then a person may argue for sex-change status on the basis of subjective 
psychological thoughts alone, stating that it is unfair to require expensive surgical intervention.  Consider 
the person who may suffer from a heart condition and is unable to undergo the sex-change surgery. Will a 
person who suffers from a disability and who cannot undergo sex-change surgery be told he or she cannot 
change into the desired sex, when another person who is more physically and financially capable can do 
so? Including a psychological component to determine sex is fraught with innumerable problems. 
149 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18. See also Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 9 
E.H.R.R. 56 (finding that England’s denial of the right of a transsexual to marry did not violate Articles 8 
or 12); Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 (same) and Sheffield & Horsham v. United 
Kingdom (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 (same). 
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III.  MUTILATING THE BODY’S INTERNAL SEX ORGANS AND 
EXTERNAL GENITALIA DOES NOT CHANGE A PERSON’S SEX. 
 Hormone treatment and plastic surgery does not transform a male to female nor a 
female to male. If that were the case, there will be a lot of surprised females who have 
undergone surgical mastectomies or hysterectomies. To even assume plastic surgery 
changes sex is an insult to these women. Since surgery cannot change sex, and  
“thoughts” are too amorphous to be objective, biology must be the determinate. 
A.  Chromosomes Determine Sex. 
 The X and Y chromosomes are the biological drivers that determine sex. A 
chromosome is one of the threadlike “packages” of genes and other DNA in the nucleus 
of a cell. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes for a total of 46 total; 44 autosomes and 
two sex chromosomes. Each parent contributes one chromosome to each pair, so 
offspring get half of their chromosomes from their mother and half from their father.150 
The egg carries the X chromosome while the sperm carries either an X or a Y.151 
Unless the Y chromosome is present and properly transcribed, the child will 
develop into a female.  In extremely rare cases, genetic mutations or defects cause 
problems with the normal sexual development process, and the child may be born with 
ambiguous genitalia (having both male and female characteristics), or, as a result of a 
mutated or missing receptor gene, the newborn may have the chromosomes of one sex 
but the gonads or genitalia of another.152 These conditions are commonly referred to as 
 
150 See, e.g., National Human Genome Research Institute: Talking Glossary, available at 
http://www.genome.gov/glossary.cfm?key=chromosome (last visited June 29, 2006).  
151 See, e.g., Biology Online, Chromosomes X and Y and Sex Determination, available at 
http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Sex_Determination (last visited June 29, 2006).  
152 Gonads are the internal sex organs.  In females, these include the uterus and ovaries and in males the 
testes.  The genitalia are the external sex organs, which include the vagina and penis.  Sometimes infants 
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intersex.153 Another condition known as sex chromosome aneuploidies is one where there 
are an abnormal number of sex chromosomes. The person may be infertile and there may 
be some abnormal sexual development, but the sex is evident and is consonant with the 
chromosomes. This condition is therefore not intersex.154 
Some transsexual advocates claim their bodies do not match their mind’s “gender 
identification”, and thus have attempted to compare themselves with intersexuals, who 
suffer from a biological (rather than psychological) ambiguity with regard to their sex.155 
However, a clinical definition of intersex only includes conditions in which the 
phenotype, or the visible characteristics, are not classifiable as either male or female (for 
example, the presence of both male and female genitalia), or chromosomal sex (e.g., XX 
or XY) is not consistent with phenotypic sex.156 There is nothing in the definition of 
intersex that refers to psychology. On the other hand, transsexuals are born with 
chromosomal and phenotypic consistency. The “inconsistency” they claim is not 
biological or physiological but psychological, referred to as gender dysphoria or gender 
 
born with ambiguous genitalia receive genital surgery shortly after birth or in early childhood.  See Garry 
L. Warne, Molecular Endocrinology of Sex Differentiation, 20 SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 169 (2002). 
153 Garry L. Warne, Molecular Endocrinology of Sex Differentiation, 20 SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 169 
(2002). 
154 Id. See Appendix A for descriptions of the various intersex conditions, sex chromosome aneuploidies, 
and conditions that have been mistakenly categorized as intersex. 
155 Some have even gone so far as to attempt to define them under the same umbrella. “Transgenderist’ is a 
term used to describe both transsexuals and intersexuals.  A transgendered person is one whose 
psychological sexual identity is opposite from the biological and physical sex that he/she appeared to be at 
birth.” According to the source, transvestites (cross-dressers) are also included in the definition of 
“transgender.” Shana Brown, Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of Transgendered Persons’ Amended Legal Sex for Marital 
Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2001). 
156 See Leonard Sax, How Common is Intersex?  A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. OF SEX 
RESEARCH 174, 176 (2002). The term “intersex” is usually reserved for individuals of intermediate sexual 
differentiation, who are most often sterile.  See William S. Klug, Michael R. Cummings, 3d ed. ESSENTIALS 
OF GENETICS 155-70 (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle Back River, N.J. 1999). 
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identity disorder (hereinafter “GID”).157 The condition of intersex precludes a diagnosis 
of transsexual or any other GID.158 
Intersex conditions are not as frequent as some transsexual literature may suggest. 
While some cite a study that purported to determine the occurrence of intersex in the U.S. 
population at around 1.7%, a sound critique of that study found that true intersexuals only 
account for .0018% of the population 
B.  Biological Definition Of Sex By Chromosome Testing Is Both Possible and 
Realistic. 
 Biology can and must be the only measure of sex. The International Olympic 
Committee used sex chromosome testing from 1966-2000 to verify the sex of female 
athletes.159 The most basic test that is used is the Buccal smear test, which involves 
staining a cell sample and evaluating it for the presence or absence of the Barr body.160 
The Barr body is caused by the inactivation of one of the two X chromosomes in genetic 
female (XX) cells. Genetic males (XY) do not show this Barr body since they only have 
one X chromosome, which stays active.161 One problem that the Olympics Committee 
 
157 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-
IV-TR, §302.85 (2000) (hereafter “DSM-IV”). 
158 Id. (“The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition.”). 
159 Myron Genel, Gender Verification No More?, available at 
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/disc/article.html?record=879 (last visited 
June 29, 2006), reprinted from 5 MEDSCAPE WOMEN’S HEALTH 3 (2000). At the 1992 winter games in 
Albertville, the IOC replaced sex chromatin with DNA testing methods to detect Y chromosomes, 
particularly the SRY sex-determining locus on the Y chromosome. See A. Serrat and A. Garcia de 
Herreros, Determination of Genetic Sex by PCR Amplification of Y-chromosome-specific Sequences, 341 
LANCET 1593-94 (1993).  DNA testing has been temporarily discontinued, in part, because the clothing 
used in athletic competition, as well as the requirement that urine samples be given in the presence of an 
observer, are sufficient methods to determine sex. See L. Elsas, R. Hayes and K. Muralidharan, Gender 
Verification in the Centennial Olympic Games, 86 GA. J. MED. ASS’N, 50-54 (1997).  
160 See Douglas R. Stewart, Medical Encyclopedia: Buccal Smear, available at 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003414.htm (last visited June 29, 2006). 
161 Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine, Position Statement: Sex Testing (Gender Verification) in Sport,
available at http://www.casm-acms.org/forms/statements//GendereVerifEng.pdf (last visited June 29, 
2006). 
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had with the Buccal smear was its inability to properly detect intersexuality. For instance, 
Maria Patino, a female hurdler from Spain, was wrongly excluded from competition 
because she failed the Buccal smear test. She had an intersex condition known as 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome.162 While she had XY chromosomes, her body lacked 
the necessary receptor for the male hormone, so she developed as a woman.  Because the 
male hormone had no impact on her body, she did not have an unfair advantage over the 
other women in the competition, and was properly considered a female.163 
With advances in genetic technology, the testis determining factor, or the gene that 
results in the development of a male, was isolated and determined to be the SRY gene, 
which in genetic males (XY), is located on the Y chromosome.164 Karyotyping165 is 
systematic while polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis of the SRY gene provides 
information about the presence of a Y chromosome within one day.166 Since the PCR test 
 
162 Other intersex conditions and sex chromosome aneuploidies that result in an incorrect diagnosis of sex 
using the Buccal smear test are Klinefelter’s Syndrome (a male with XXY chromosomes that would be 
diagnosed as a woman), 46XX males (males that are XX but have the male determining portion of the Y 
chromosome inscribed on one of their X chromosomes), Gonadal Dysgenesis (women who are XY but do 
not have testes), and Turner’s Syndrome (women who have an XO chromosome makeup.  Since they only 
have one X chromosome, the Buccal smear test would show them to be male.).  See A. Carlson, When is a 
Woman not a Woman?, WOMEN SPORT FITNESS, 24-29 (March 1991). 
163 Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine, Position Statement: Sex Testing (Gender Verification) in Sport,
available at http://www.casm-acms.org/forms/statements/GendereVerifEng.pdf (last visited April 4, 2005). 
Unlike Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia is an intersex condition that 
would pass the Buccal smear test for femininity, but would confer an unfair advantage upon the athlete. 
The athlete would have XX chromosomes, but the adrenal glands produce excess androgen, resulting in 
masculine characteristics which would inevitably enhance strength and muscle mass. Id. Hermaphrodites 
and pseudohermaphrodites may or may not pass the Buccal smear test, depending on what sex was 
assigned to them and whether it corresponds with their chromosomal sex. Id. 
164 XY females nearly always lack the SRY gene. In rare cases it is present but mutated. XX males have it 
transcribed onto one of their X chromosomes. Studies have shown that when the gene is added to XX mice, 
the sex reverses from female to male. Corinne Cotinot, et al., Molecular Genetics of Sex Determination, 20 
SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 157 (2002) available at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/444686 (last visited 
June 29, 2006). 
165 Karyotyping is a photomicrograph of chromosomes arranged according to a standard classification.  
http://karyotyping.tripod.com (last visited July 18, 2006).  
166 C. Sultan et al., Ambiguous Genitalia in the Newborn, SEMINARS IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, Aug. 
2002, available at MEDLINE (FirstSearch version), NLM No. 100909394.  “The SRY gene has a 
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is “far simpler and less expensive than previous techniques for duplicating  DNA [it has] 
democratized genetic research, putting it within reach of all biologists, even those with no 
training in molecular biology.”167 
Chromosome testing remains highly important and relevant. Genetic testing for sex 
chromosome aneuploidies and intersex conditions is simple and fairly routine in the 
diagnosis of these conditions. About 900 genetic tests are now being offered by 
diagnostic laboratories.168 
Chromosome analysis, referred to as karyotyping, involves looking directly at the 
chromosomes to determine if there are any abnormalities like a chromosomal 
rearrangement; and for more subtle genetic disorders, the actual DNA sequence of a 
particular gene is analyzed.169 In the rare cases where there happens to be dysgenesis 
 
fundamental role in sex determination and is believed to be the switch that initiates the testis development.  
SRY is regulated by genes upstream in the sex determination pathway and exerts its function by interaction 
with genes downstream in the pathway.  Any deregulation of the sex pathway leads to abnormal sex 
differentiation and, in some cases, to complete sex reversal.  Translocations of SRY are known to be 
associated with 80% of cases of 46, XX maleness.  Mutations in the SRY, SOX9, SF1, and WT1 genes are 
associated with 46, XY gonadal dysgenesis, as are deletions of chromosome 2q, 9p, and 10q, and 
duplication of chromosome Xp21.” http://jcem.endojournals.org/cgi/content/full/85/2/483 (last visited July 
18, 2006).  
167 Tabitha M. Powledge, The Polymerase Chain Reaction, available at 
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/The%20Polymerase%20Chain%20Reaction.pdf (last visited June 30, 2006); see 
also Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): Replicating Millions of Copies From a Single Gene, available at 
http://www.waynesword.palomar.edu/lmexer3b.htm (last visited June 30, 2006).  The inventor of PCR, 
Karry B. Mullis, was awarded the Noble Prize in 1993.  See Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), available 
at http://www.genome.gov/10000207 (last visited June 30, 2006); The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1993, 
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/ (last visited June 30, 2006.) 
168 See Francis S. Collins, A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing: World Economic Forum, January 24, 2003,
available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited June 30, 2006). See also Denise Casey, What 
Can the New Gene Tests Tell Us?, available at 
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/publicat/judges/judge.html (last visited June 30, 
2006).   
169 For example, Klinefelter’s Syndrome is diagnosed with peripheral blood karyotyping to detect an extra 
X chromosome (The Medical Algorithms Project, Criteria for the Diagnosis of Klinefelter’s Syndrome, 
available at http://www.medal.org/visitor/www/Active/ch43/ch43.19/ch43.19.01.aspx (last visited June 30, 
2006); Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is diagnosed by testing for mutations in the AR gene (Leonard 
Pinsky, Mark A. Trifiro, GeneReviews: Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, available at 
http://www.geneclinics.org/profiles/androgen/details.html (last visited June 30, 2006)); 21-hydroxylase 
deficiency (the most common cause of congenital adrenal hyperplasia) is diagnosed by testing the 
CYP21A2 gene for mutations or deletions (Maria I. New, Andrea Putnam, GeneReviews: 21-Hydroxylase 
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between observed sexual characteristics and the results of the Buccal smear test, 
specialized genetic testing can be utilized. A PCR test can be done to detect the SRY 
gene. Through this process, a person’s sex can be reliably determined, even if the initial 
Buccal smear does not correctly diagnose a rare condition.170 
The argument that sex must include a psychological component is specious. The 
few cases which do not on first blush neatly fit into one category do not undermine the 
male-female paradigm any more than birth defects undermine normal human physiology. 
The logic behind the argument for a “gender spectrum” stems from a desire to create a 
norm from an anomaly. As already noted, transsexuals are not intersex and intersexuals 
are not transsexuals. An intersex condition is an ambiguity between the chromosomes 
and the gonads or genitalia. Transsexuals have harmony between the chromosomes, 
gonads and genitalia, but claim a conflict between the mind and the body.171 
The transsexual movement is reminiscent of cultural trends in the 1960s to 
“normalize” schizophrenia by claiming schizophrenics were  victims of “psychiatric 
oppression.” As a result of these efforts, thousands of mentally ill people were released 
from hospitals to the streets, often becoming homeless or incarcerated.172 Anne Fausto-
 
Deficiency, available at 
http://www.geneclinics.org/servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key=rx1NKmeGcV253
&gry=&fcn=y&fw=jirn&filename=/profiles/cah/index.html (last visited June 30, 2006).  Francis S. Collins, 
A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing, available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited June 30, 
2006) (Dr. Collins is the Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute); see also 
http://www.genetests.org (for a list of specific types of tests) (last visited June 30, 2006). 
170 Given the small proportion of intersex in the population (.0018%), and the fact that many of these 
conditions still yield a recognizable phenotype (see Appendix A), the resulting amount of people requiring 
additional testing is almost unmeasurable. See Appendix B for a diagram of the testing process. 
171 See DSM-IV-TR §302.85. “Individuals with Gender Identity Disorder have normal genitalia (in contrast 
to the ambiguous genitalia or hypogonadism found in physical intersex conditions).” Id. at 579. 
172 See Paul McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures, Joseph Epstein and Robert Atwan, eds., THE BEST 
AMERICAN ESSAYS 1993 188-91(Ticknor & Fields, New York 1993); Sax, How Common is Intersex?, 39 J. 
OF SEX RESEARCH at 181.
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Sterling, the author of the study erroneously claiming intersex conditions affect 1.7% of 
the population, argued that all possible combinations of sexual anatomy should be 
considered normal, and that classifications of normal and abnormal sexual anatomy are 
“mere social conventions, prejudices which can and should be set aside by an enlightened 
intelligentsia.”173 One advocate wrote that “transsexualism [is] a socially constructed 
problem created by the medical establishment . . .”174 Harry Benjamin opined that 
“[i]nstead of treating the patient, might it not be wiser and more sensible to treat society. . 
. ?”175 The currently fashionable movement toward “tolerance” and freedom from 
“oppressive” social constraints becomes absurd when it ignores reality. Binary sex is  
more than just a paradigm – it is a medical reality, and it must remain a legal reality in 
order to preserve the integrity of the law.176 
1. Surgically and chemically mutilating the body to alter 
sexual appearance is experimental and controversial medical 
treatment.
Plastic surgery and hormone therapy may alter a person’s physical characteristics 
but cannot alter the person’s sex. A woman who had a hysterectomy and mastectomy is a 
woman. A woman who thinks she’s a man is a woman. Therefore, a woman who’s had a 
hysterectomy and mastectomy and thinks she’s a man remains a woman. 
 Radical surgical procedures on male-to-female transsexuals include removal of 
the penis and scrotum, bilateral orchiectomy (removal of the testicles), vaginoplasty 
(creation of artificial vagina), estrogen hormone injections, and perhaps a tracheal shave 
 
173 Sax, How Common is Intersex?, 39 J. OF SEX RESEARCH at 181.
174 Id. 
175 Leah Cahan Schaefer and Connie Christine Wheeler, Harry Benjamin’s First Ten Cases (1938-1953): A 
Clinical Historical Note, 24 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 83 (1995). 
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(reducing the tracheal cartilage commonly called the Adam’s apple). Female-to-male 
surgery includes a radical mastectomy, a total hysterectomy (removal of the uterus and 
ovaries), testosterone injections, and in rare cases, an artificial construction of a penis 
(phalloplasty) or enlargement of the clitoris (metaidoioplasty). Phalloplasty merely 
creates an imitation penis that lacks sensitivity and will not become erect without a 
stiffening device.177 Studies indicate that many who undergo a phalloplasty are unhappy 
with their resulting imitation organ.178 When a patient chooses not to undergo a 
phalloplasty, another surgical option is a metaidoioplasty. This technique allows the 
clitoris to extend further out, and it shapes the enlarged clitoris to look more like a small 
penis.179 The length of the metaidoioplasty-enlarged clitoris would still be insufficient for 
intercourse.180 
Hormonal treatment of the female-to-male and male-to-female transsexuals can 
cause a number of dangerous side effects.181 Some research shows that female-to-male 
transsexuals who have been treated with hormones for 4-5 years, but have not had a 
 
176 Id. 
177 See Janice Raymond, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE 160-161 (Teachers 
College Press 1994) (1979). 
178 See James Barrett, Psychological and Social Function Before and After Phalloplasty, 2 INT’L J. 
TRANSGENDERISM 1 (1998),available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0301.htm (last visited June 30, 
2006). The study notes that as few as 39% having phalloplasty are happy with result, leaving 61% 
dissatisfied.  
179 See Carlo Trombetta, et. al., Total Sex-Reassignment Surgery in Female-to-Male Transsexuals: a One-
Stage Technique, 90 BJU INT’L 754, 758 (2002). 
180 Id. 
181 Walter Futterweit, Endocrine Therapy of Transsexualism and Potential Complications of Long-term 
Treatment, 27 ARCHIVE OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 209-18 (1998). Some complications include water and 
sodium retention, increased erythopoiesis, decreased carbohydrate tolerance, decreased serum high-density 
lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, liver enzyme abnormalities occur, obesity, emotional or psychiatric 
problems, and sleep apnea.    
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hysterectomy, have developed “intrauterine complications.”182 Hormone treatment 
substantially increases risk of cardiovascular disease and liver complications.183 Long-
term, high-dose androgen therapy is associated with impaired vascular reactivity in 
genetic females, independent of the effects of androgens on lipoprotein levels or vessel 
size.184 Androgen treatment in a male-to-female transsexual can cause recurrent 
myocardial infarction.185 
“The number of deaths in male-to-female transsexuals was five times the number 
expected, due to increased numbers of suicide and death of unknown cause.”186 Based on 
a study of 303 male-to-female transsexuals undergoing estrogen hormone treatment, 
pulmonary embolism, cerebral thrombosis, myocardial infarction, prostatic metaplasia, 
and breast cancer were not uncommon side effects of the hormones.187 
“Sex-reassignment” surgery is an experimental and likely unethical treatment 
because it dramatically increases health risks while showing no objective evidence of 
curing the mental disorder, gender identity disorder. A recent study revealed that major 
complications can occur during, immediately and some time after sex-reassignment 
surgery.188 One of the most common and gruesome risks of a male-to-female SRS is a 
 
182 Shadow Morton et al., Notes on Gender Transition, FTM 101 – The Invisible Transsexuals (last revised 
1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTM101.htm (last visited June 30, 2006) (ranging from fibroid 
cysts, to endometriosis, to fibrous scar tissue that formed around reproductive organs). 
183 Id. 
184 See Robyn J. McCredie et al., Vascular Reactivity is Impaired in Genetic Females Taking High-Dose 
Androgens, 32 J. AM. COL. OF CARDIOLOGY 1331-1335 (1998).  
185 See Jose’ Biller, et al., Ischemic Cerebrovascular Disease and Hormone Therapy for Infertility and 
Transsexualism, 45 NEUROLOGY 1611, 1612 (1995); H. Asscheman et al., Mortality and Morbidity in 
Transsexual Patients with Cross-Gender Hormone Treatment, 38 METABOLISM 869 (1989). 
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 S. Krege et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results and Long-term Follow-up in 66 
Patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396-402 (2001).  Fourteen percent had major complications during, 
immediately, and some time after, surgery. This includes “severe wound infections in six, a rectal lesion in 
three, necrosis of the glans in three and necrosis of the distal urethra in one.” 
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rectovaginal fistula which also includes a very high risk of infection.189 In addition, minor 
complications are frequent.190 The female-to-male transsexual faces some unique 
problems after a double mastectomy and/or mastopexy if they are taking testosterone 
hormones.191 Therefore, because of the dangers surrounding the surgery, the validity of 
the treatment should be questioned and certainly the law should not encourage it by 
granting the patient a new legal sex status. 
 Furthermore, some patients have refuted the success of the surgical procedures.  
According to a long-term follow-up of male-to-female transsexuals that underwent SRS, 
30% considered retrospectively the SRS a mistake.192 In particular, there was a case 
concerning a male-to-female that lived as a female for approximately two and a half 
years, but the day before his SRS, the hospital stopped performing the procedure.193 
Mickey was born male, but throughout his early life he felt uncomfortable with his sex 
and longed to be a woman. As a result, when Mickey was 22, he applied for SRS.194 The 
doctors evaluated Mickey and approved his sex-reassignment surgery.195 Mickey began 
to take hormones and dress and act as a woman, and lived as a female for 2½ years.196 
189 Sarah, Notes on Gender Transition: Living With a Rectovaginal Fistula (1996; editor’s note 2000) 
available at http://www.avitale.com/Rectovaginal_Fistula.html. (last visited June 30, 2006) “Symptoms 
include intrusion of intestinal fluids, gases and feces into the vagina, and often intestinal distress.” 
190 S. Krege et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results and Long-term Follow-up in 66 
patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396-402 (2001). Thirty-six percent had meatal stenosis, i.e. the 
narrowing of the urethra which can cause difficulty urinating. 
191 Shadow Morton et al., Notes on Gender Transition, FTM 101 – The Invisible Transsexuals (revised 
1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTM101.htm (last visited June 30, 2006).  “With testosterone 
comes body hair. The chest hair that grows in around the sutures and incisions can, at the very least, be 
incredibly annoying, and in the extreme can be ingrown and even cause infection.”  
192 See  Gunnar Lindelmalm, M.D. et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of “Sex Change” in 13 Male-to-Female 
Transsexuals, 15 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 187, 199-201 (1986). 
193 See Elsie R. Shore, Ph.D, The Former Transsexual: A Case Study, 13  ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR,
277, 280 (1984). 
194 Id. at 278. 
195 Id. at 279. 
196 Id. 
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Researchers report that, in fact, he was a very convincing female.197 However, a day 
before he was to enter the hospital to have his genitals removed, the hospital changed its 
policy and refused to perform further sex-reassignment surgeries.198 Disappointed, 
Mickey continued to live as a female. Through a series of events and therapy, however, 
his desire to become a woman subsided until it finally disappeared.199 Mickey fell in love 
with a woman and repudiated his desire to have his genitals removed and to live as the 
opposite sex. Researchers report that he now leads a happier and more stable life than he 
did when living as a woman.200 Tragically, researchers also tell stories of individuals who 
have the same recovery only after sex-reassignment surgery has taken place.201 
In addition to the negative subjective data from patients, there is a lack of 
evidence showing that SRS grants the recipient an objective advantage in social 
rehabilitation.202 Instead, there have been findings that point to the “possibility of 
psychosocial intervention as an alternative to surgery in the treatment of transsexuals.”203 
197 Id. at 278. 
198 Id. at 280. 
199 Id. at 282. 
200 Id. at 281-82. 
201 See e.g. J. Money & G. Golff, Sex reassignment: Male to Female to Male, 2 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR 245-250 (1973); J. Randall, Indications for Sex Reassignment Surgery, 1 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL 
BEHAVIOR 153-161 (1971). Dr. Robert Spitzer, who once opposed reparative therapy (therapy with a goal 
to change a person’s “sexual orientation), now acknowledges that through such therapy “some gay men and 
lesbians are able to . . . change the core features of sexual orientation.” Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay 
Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from 
Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 403, 415 (2003). See also 
Elaine V. Siegel, FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY: CHOICE WITHOUT VOLITION (The Analytic Press, Inc.: 
Hillsdale, N.J. 1988) (reporting  that more than half of the twelve woman who were referred to her for 
counseling made complete transitions from homosexual to heterosexual). 
202 See Jon K. Meyer, M.D. et al., Sex Reassignment: Follow-up, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1015 (1979). 
One follow-up study found that “adoption of the new gender role coincides with the hormonal reassignment 
and therefore is long before the surgical gender reassignment.”  Friedemann Pfäfflin, et al., Sex 
Reassignment – Thirty Years of International Follow-up Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A 
Comprehensive Review, 1961-1991(translated from German into American English by Roberta B. Jacobson 
and Alf B. Meier) available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/pfaefflin/1000.htm (last visited June 30, 
2006) (IJT Electronic Books). 
203 David H. Barlow, PhD. et al., Gender Identity Change in Transsexuals, Follow-up and Replications, 36 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1002-07 (1979). Conservatively diagnosed transsexuals received 
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There are cases of adults with GID that persuasively display how gender dysphoria can 
remit “over the years with or without treatment and in response to various life events and 
comorbid psychopathology.”204 The law should not grant a new legal sex status based on 
a mental condition which is subject to change or a surgical procedure that is possibly a 
mistake.   
 The American Psychiatric Association made substantial changes to the diagnostic 
classification of GID in 1994.205 “These include[d] collapsing the three diagnoses of 
gender identity disorder of childhood, transsexualism, and gender identity disorder of 
adolescence or adulthood, nontranssexual type, that were in the DSM-III-R into one 
overarching diagnosis, gender identity disorder . . . .”206 Therefore, transsexualism is a 
subsection of GID. However, unlike the DSM-III-R, the diagnosis of GID cannot be 
given to persons with physical intersex conditions.207 The DSM-IV-TR makes a 
distinction between individuals born with physical ambiguity (intersex), and one who is 
conflicted mentally.208 The law should make a distinction as well. If the law grants a new 
“sex” status for those who have been diagnosed with GID and who undergo SRS, the law 
undoubtedly will be required to grant a new sex status for all individuals diagnosed with 
 
psychosocial  intervention that proved to be successful in aligning the individual’s gender identity with the 
natural sex of the patient. 
204 Isaac Marks et al., Adult Gender Identity Disorder Can Remit, 41 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 273-75 
(2000) (“A dramatic cure of apparent transsexualism, by less than 3 hours of exorcism over two sessions, 
was documented and carefully measured from 7 months before to 2 years after the exorcism.” Furthermore, 
there are additional individual cases where gender dysphoria appeared with other mental illness and while 
the patient was treated (often with medicine) for the latter mental illness, gender dysphoria subsided or was 
completely cured. “Adult GID reportedly remitted for up to 10 years in response to sexual relationships and 
other events in five cases evaluated by the second author (R.G.).”). 
205 See Susan J. Bradley, M.D. et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 872,  873 (1997). 
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GID, even without SRS.209 There are as many opinions concerning the treatment of GID 
as there are psychiatrists and psychologists.210 The lack of uniformity among the field 
may be due to the rarity of the diagnosis.211 One study concluded that a variety of 
interventions involving the parent and the child lowered cross-gender identification.212 
There are three approaches concerning child/parent intervention: behavioral, eclectic and 
analytic.213 Literature concerning the treatment of adolescents is rare, however supportive 
therapy is the general approach.214 The political movement of the transsexual community 
has had a profound effect on the field of counseling by causing some extreme counselors 
to believe that  this mental illness should be encouraged.215 
Many psychiatrists oppose treating adolescence GID with irreversible measures or 
even hormone administration too quickly because it may be a mistake.216 Some 
psychiatrists speculate “a rapid agreement for sex reassignment would signal that the 
therapist (who should maintain a neutral position) supports the patient’s desire for a sex 
change.”217 Even more concerned, Dr. Paul Mc Hugh, Chairman of the Psychiatry 
Department at John’s Hopkins, criticized SRS as “radical, irreversible surgeries.”218 
209 If transsexualism is later declassified as a mental illness, like some are urging for pedophilia, then sex 
merely becomes a fleeting transitional thought solely dependent on personal whim. Equal protection then 
becomes a tangled web of meaningless prose.  
210 See Bradley, et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD 
ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY at 878-79. 
211 Id at 878. 
212 Id.
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 879. 
215 Lynne Carroll et al., Counseling Transgendered, Transsexual, and Gender-Variant, 80 J. COUNSELING 
& DEVELOP. 131 (2002) (advocating that the counselor listen, empathize, assume a “not knowing stance”, 
provide a “safe zone” where “gender diversity is not only accepted but celebrated.”) (emphasis added). 
216 Bernd Meyenburg, Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescence: Outcomes of Psychotherapy, 34 
ADOLESCENCE 11, 11-13 (1999). 
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 The source of GID is undetermined and therefore, any “treatment” administered 
to a GID patient is experimental. Some psychologists follow an “instinctual 
hypothesis.”219 For example, Dr. Pickstone-Taylor proposes that the “sole cause of GID 
is ‘instinctual’ and that the pervasive cross-gender behavior of children with GID simply 
reflects their ‘true predilections or interests.’”220 In contrast, Drs. Bradley and Zucker 
adhere to the premise that the origin of GID is “multifactorial”.221 Those who follow the 
latter model generally determine that one must look beyond biology to observe factors 
such as: “the role of temperament, parental reinforcement of cross-gender behavior 
during the sensitive period of gender identity formation, family dynamics, parental 
psychopathology, peer relationships, and the multiple meanings that might underlie the 
child’s fantasy of becoming a member of the opposite sex.”222 Although the exact source 
of GID is unknown, a prospective study concluded that individuals with a 
nonhomosexual preference, combined with psychopathology and dissatisfaction with 
secondary sex characteristics, were more likely to function poorer postoperatively and 
express more discontentment about the outcome or result SRS had on their lives.223 This 
may indicate that homosexuality is an indicator of a better postoperative outcome. Thus, 
there are many unanswered questions. What is clear, however, is that the law should not 
jump into this morass to encourage the anomaly as the norm by giving legal marriage 
status to transsexuals. 
 
219 Simon D. Pickstone-Taylor, Children with Gender Nonconformity, 42 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND 
ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 266-68 (2003). 
220 Id. at 267. 
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223 See Yolanda L.S. Smith, et al., SEX REASSIGNMENT: PREDICTORS AND OUTCOMES OF TREATMENT FOR 
TRANSSEXUALS 85, 105-06 (2002). 
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 2. There are many mental disorders which are either 
permanent or where surgery to conform the mind to the body is 
unethical. 
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the diagnostic criteria for GID include a strong 
persistent cross-gender identification that is manifested by persistent discomfort with the 
birth sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex, and clinical 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.224 There are various mental disorders associated with GID as coexisting 
disorders or as associated disorders.225 Children diagnosed with GID may also have as 
coexisting mental disorders Separation Anxiety Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
and symptoms of depression.226 Adolescents with GID are especially at risk for 
depression and suicidal ideation.227 Adults with GID may have anxiety and depressive 
symptoms.228 Males with GID may also have a history of Transvestite Fetishism, other 
paraphilias, and associated Personality Disorders.229 In addition, there are significant 
social, personal, and occupational issues which may result from surgical sex changes, and 
the patient may require psychotherapy or counseling.230 Major self-mutilation including 
eye enucleation and amputation of limbs or genitals is also usually associated with severe 
gender identity disturbances or with psychotic states.231 
224 See DSM-IV-TR §302.85, at 576, 579, 580-81. 
225 See id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
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231 Tero J. Taiminen, Contagion of Deliberate Self-Harm Among Adolescent Inpatients, 37 J. AM. ACAD. OF 
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 211 (1998).  
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 Patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder will typically manifest 
self-mutilation beginning in adolescence and may continue to manifest self-mutilation for 
decades.232 Self-mutilation and the act of “letting of blood” becomes a quick method of 
relieving anxiety or anger.233 However, the mere fact that a behavior will relieve anxiety 
or psychological distress is insufficient to justify the behavior when it involves 
mutilation. Similarly, SRS is a type of bodily mutilation that is not justified merely 
because some contend it will relieve psychological distress.234 Psychological distress is 
not unique to GID; it is a characteristic of a mental disorder, which is defined in the 
DSM-IV-TR as “a clinically important collection of symptoms (these can be behavioral 
or psychological) that causes an individual distress, disability, or the increased risk of 
suffering pain, disability, death, or the loss of freedom.”235 Dr. Tabin, of the National 
Committee for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, noted the danger of using the 
prevention of significant psychological distress as a justification for stress-reducing 
behavior by pointing out that suicide attempts would then have to be considered normal 
when desired by the participants.236 
There are many types of disorders of self-mutilation in which a significant level 
of cognitive dissonance exists between bodily perception and reality. Theories regarding 
the appropriate therapy differ. Whether it is amputating a limb or burning oneself, the 
 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
234 “Some males with Gender Identity Disorder resort to self-treatment with hormones and may very rarely 
perform their own castration or penectomy.” DSM-IV-TR §302.85, at 578. 
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proposed manner of treatment for such disorders varies widely depending on the etiology. 
GID is a mental disorder. As such, GID is analogous to other self-mutilating disorders. 
Cognitive dissonance between mind and body is insufficient to find SRS as the only 
solution. 
 Self-mutilation is defined as an “act that often alleviates pathological symptoms 
such as a perplexing feeling of numbness, strangeness, and unreality in regard to one’s 
body, thoughts, and emotions as well as to persons and objects in the environment.”237 
Among the different types of self-mutilation is genital mutilation.238 SRS is analogous to 
genital mutilation. 
 Psychological pain is a common symptom of self-mutilation disorders, in which 
individuals report that their actions help relieve psychological pain.239 Some claim that 
self-injury is a means of promoting a sense of well-being and control.240 Self-mutilation 
disorders are often related to life factors and clinical correlates such as childhood sexual 
abuse and subsequent Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and life conditions such as the loss 
of a parent, childhood illness, depression, physical abuse, parental alcoholism, or parental 
marital violence.241 There is also a strong correlation between sexual abuse and GID.242 
237 Robert T. Waska, Self-mutilation, Substance Abuse, and the Psychoanalytic Approach: Four Cases, 52 
AM. J. OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 18 (1998). 
238 Victoria E. White, College Students and Self-Injury: Intervention Strategies for Counselors, 5 J. OF 
COLLEGE COUNSELING 105 (2002). 
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242 Bradley, et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 37 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD 
ADOLESC. PSYCH. at 878; Bernd Meyenburg, Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescence: Outcomes of 
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 Treatment for self-mutilating disorders includes learning to manage self-injurious 
impulses and psychoanalysis.243 Specifically, self-destructive acts can be understood as 
resulting from and symbolizing certain intrapsychic phantasies involving wishes, fears, 
and compromises, in which  psychoanalysis provides the optimum vehicle for the 
modification of the “internal self and object representations.”244 Psychotherapy is often 
effective in cognitive dissonance between mind and body, like GID, which in essence is 
an intrapsychic phantasy that one is a member of the opposite sex.245 
Eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia are characterized by the 
co-occurrence of pathological thoughts and emotions concerning appearance, eating, and 
food, leading to alterations in body composition and functioning that are the direct result 
of these symptoms.246 Similar to disturbances in body image, GID is a disturbance in 
gender image that often leads to alterations in body composition and appearance.247 
Proposed treatments for anorexia include acute weight restoration and re-feeding as well 
as individual, family, and group therapy.248 Treatments for bulimia consist mainly of 
cognitive-behavioral approaches, as such treatments have been found effective.249 While 
both GID and eating disorders are mental disorders in which there is a discrepancy 
between one’s perceived and actual physical body, acceptable treatments for eating 
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disorders consist of changing mental constructs through cognitive therapy, or changing 
behavior through therapy.250 Treatment does not consist of validating the skewed body 
image, no matter how much the patient may truly perceive that mental image to be 
reality.251 In the same way, proper treatment for GID should focus on treating the 
patient’s mind in order to develop a healthy self-concept of body through cognitive 
therapy, rather than through radical surgical mutilation.  
 Paraphilias are a type of sexual disorder characterized by recurrent, intense sexual 
urges or behaviors that are considered unusual or deviant by society.252 Such urges or 
behaviors also cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, 
or other important areas of functioning.253 Likewise, GID is also a type of sexual disorder 
that can be described as a recurring sexual behavior, or a mind set, that causes clinically 
significant distress or impairment.254 GID should be treated as any other paraphilia by 
cognitive therapy and not mutilation. 
 Another type of sexual disorder is sadomasochism, which is characterized by a 
relation of dominance and submission, infliction of pain that is experienced as 
pleasurable by both partners, deliberate humiliation of the other party, fetishistic 
elements, and one or more ritualistic activities.255 In some instances, sadomasochism is 
paraphiliac when it is the only way for an individual to get sexually aroused and 
satisfied.256 Treatment for sadomasochism includes traditional psychoanalysis and 
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behavior therapy techniques.257 Sadomasochism is treated as a “mental disorder,” 
characterized by distress, harm, or functional impairment.258 Even though in some 
instances sadomasochism may be the only means of sexual arousal in an individual, 
thereby apt to cause a significant amount of psychological distress if the behavior is not 
permitted, treatment entails modifying the mind and behavior instead of condoning such 
activity for the sake of easing the mind and decreasing psychological distress.  
 Pedophilia is a sexual disorder in which adults justify having sex with children by 
displacing blame onto the infants.259 Treatment for pedophilia includes negative 
conditioning, cognitive-behavioral therapy, medication and hormones to decrease the sex 
drive.260 In short, treatment focuses on changing the sexual urges. Pedophilia, in its 
description as a “perversion,” implies that there is a “moral normative standard” from 
which the perversion deviates. The question therefore  remains how one defines the 
normative conception of perversion. Deeply rooted in American culture and public policy 
is the norm of male and female, man and woman. 
 As a matter of public policy, in order for consistency to prevail in our 
jurisprudence, the determination of sex must be independent from the psychological 
musings. An individual’s sex preference can manifest itself at different times in life: 
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childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.261 If a person’s sex were determined by 
psychological inclinations, sex would become variable, changing throughout the course 
of life. The diagnosis of GID is itself a changing diagnosis since some children diagnosed 
with GID may later in life display few, if any, symptoms.262 In fact, only a very small 
number of children with GID continue to have symptoms that meet the criteria for GID in 
later adolescence or adulthood.263 Most  children with GID display less overt cross-
gender behaviors as time passes, as parental intervention increases, or as peer response 
increases.264 
 Treatment for children diagnosed with GID focuses on secondary problems such 
as depression, anxiety, and self-esteem.265 Therapeutic modalities for children with GID 
are for the most part diametrically different than some forms of treatment for adults, since 
children typically undergo psychosocial therapy sessions only, and the focus of treatment 
is designed to instill positive identification of the child with the child’s biological sex.266 
Adult males whose overt signs of GID appear later and more gradually in adulthood tend 
to be more ambivalent about SRS and are also “less likely to be satisfied after 
surgery.”267 There are reported cases of spontaneous remission of GID in adults who 
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develop symptoms later in life.268 The inconsistency of the diagnosis of GID with the 
passage of time and other variables, the mistaken confusion of sexual preference with 
gender confusion, and the possibility of remission of GID underscore the dangerous use 
of a psychological definition of sex as the basis for a legal definition of sex. 
 For transsexuals, SRS cannot serve as a bright line to determine sex. SRS is not 
always the proposed treatment for GID.269 The Harry Benjamin International Association 
Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders noted that some individuals diagnosed 
with GID neither desired nor were candidates for SRS.270 A person claiming the same 
cognitive dissonance between perceived and actual sex could argue that sex should be 
determined solely by subjective mental thoughts. Such a person may contend that SRS is 
not desired, is too expensive, or is contraindicated due to some secondary medical 
condition.271 Thus, SRS cannot be deemed the threshold over which one must cross to 
legally change sex. Subjective mental thoughts about sex are too amorphous to use as a 
baseline to establish sex. The only line to draw must be with the biological and not the 
psychological pen. 
 The modern approach to treatment of GID highlights the importance of cognitive 
styles and nonsurgical psychological treatments, despite the earlier emphasis on SRS, as 
propagated in 1966 by Harry Benjamin.272 The use of cognitive-behavioral therapy in 
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treating GID is important due to the psychological etiology of GID. A 1976 study found 
that gender dysphoria was caused by an excessive identification of patients with their 
mothers, and the inability of these mothers to permit their sons to separate from their 
mother’s bodies – resulting in an etiology of mother-infant symbiosis and absent 
fathers.273 In the same vein, a study in 1992 proposed that persons with GID seemed to 
have similar mental dimensions to those who suffered from chronic depressive 
disorders.274 Despite 30 years of research on gender dysphoria, there is a marked lack of 
research on the “broader issues of cognitive style and functioning, thought processes and 
cognitive maturation as they may be related to the organization and evolution of gender 
structures.”275 
There are also various ethical concerns that arise in the use of SRS to treat GID.  
Part of the ethical code of the helping professions is that treatment must have 
beneficiance and the patient has the right to treatment with the least drastic alternative.276 
Beneficiance or responsible care means that psychologists engage in actions that are 
“likely to benefit others, or at least do no harm.277 A study in 1978 showed that those who 
regretted having SRS shared the following characteristics in common: inadequate family 
support, inadequate self-support, inappropriate physical build, and heterosexual 
experience following SRS.278  A study of transsexual satisfaction in 1965 showed that 
more than 33% attempted suicide post-surgery, and  more than 25% appeared to have a 
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schizoid or personality disorder.279 A study of male-to-female transsexuals in 1981 
showed that 24% of SRS outcomes were unsatisfactory.280 
Psychiatric diagnoses change over time, as evidenced by the ever-changing 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.281 For example, multiple personality disorder was 
recognized in the DSM III-R under its traditional name, but in the manual, DSM-IV and 
DSM-IV-TR, it appears as disassociative identity disorder.282 Since psychiatric diagnoses 
are subject to change, and since the disorder is subject to change during a person’s life, it 
is precarious to rest a legal definition of sex on a constantly moving premise. 
 Some contend that gender identity is defined by how a person feels at any given 
moment.283 The fallacy in relying on the subjective is that sex becomes merely a feeling.
Human feeling, by definition capricious, cannot be a standard upon which our judicial 
system relies – sex cannot be determined by a balancing of masculine and feminine 
feelings. Rather, sex must be determined by objective and immutable standards. 
 The problem of defining sex psychologically is best illustrated by considering 
another mental disorder, known as Apotemnophilia or Body Integrity Identity Disorder 
(“BIID”).284 Apotemnophiles feel that they are a disabled person trapped in a nondisabled 
body (not unlike believing one is a man trapped in a woman’s body).285 Clinicians 
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generally recognize this disorder as a paraphilia, or a displaced sexual desire such as 
transvestism, voyeurism, pedophilia and bestiality.286  
Apotemnophilia is a condition where one has an overwhelming desire to amputate 
his or her own body parts for sexual purposes or be with an amputee sexually.287 Dr. Greg 
Furth “is a longtime crusader for increased BIID research. He has also been trying for 
many years to persuade doctors to cut off his right leg.” Id. Although a seemingly 
obscure phenomenon, an entire subculture has developed that advocates and caters to 
voluntary amputations. All one must do is perform a simple internet search with the term 
“wannabe” (or “amputee wannabe”) for those who wish to have an amputation and 
“devotee” (or “amputee devotee”) for those who wish to have sexual relations with an 
amputee.288 Apotemnophilia “is a psychological condition in which the individual 
requests an elective amputation. Individuals with this condition experience the persistent 
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desire to have their body physically match the idealized image they have of themselves. 
This desire forces individuals to deal with the paradox of losing one or more major limbs 
(i.e. arm[s] or leg[s]) to become whole. In their minds, ‘Less is more’.”289 According to 
researchers at Columbia University,  
 There are several conditions which may cause patients to seek amputation.  These 
include: 
1. Transsexuals who usually mutilate only the genitals in order to assume the  
 
physical appearance of the opposite sex. 
 
2.  Schizophrenics who may self-mutilate in response to voices ordering them to 
do so or in response to a delusional belief that the body part is defective or bad. 
3.  Patients with a personality disorder, who appear to mutilate to relieve tension 
or gain secondary advancement. 
4. Confused patients who may injure themselves due to disinhibition, poor 
judgment or perceptual difficulties. 
5.  Depressed patients who may mutilate themselves in a failed suicide attempt, or 
as atonement for perceived sins. 
6. Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder who seek body modification in 
response to some perceived physical imperfection. 
7. Patients with Factitious Disorder are so eager to enter the sick person's role that 
they will intentionally produce psychological or physical symptoms. 
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8. BIID patients appear to seek amputation in order to achieve their perceived 
body image.290 
The number of people who identify themselves as wannabes has grown 
significantly in the past few years. One website boasts over 3,600 members.291 The search 
returns several hundred results, and not surprisingly, most of these people are affiliated 
with the transsexual movement. Some even call their desire to remove a perfectly healthy 
limb transsexual in nature. For example, proponents of amputation as a “cure” insist, 
much like transsexuals, that the only way to help these mentally ill people is to mutilate 
their bodies to fit their minds. To date, most of the American medical community still 
recognizes the amputation of a perfectly healthy limb as unethical and surgeons in the 
United States will not amputate the limbs of apotemnophiliacs.292 If the state validates 
the actions of the mentally ill by legally recognizing their “new” sex, the outcome of such 
actions has the potential to lead to even more extreme mutilations, such as the amputation 
of healthy limbs. A psychiatrist that specializes in apotemnophilia cannot guarantee that 
after surgery to remove a healthy limb the urge will not come back to remove more 
healthy limbs.293 Medical ethicist Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania says, 
“It’s absolute utter lunacy to go along with a request to maim somebody” either sexually 
 
290 Id. 
291 Carl Elliott, Costing an Arm and a Leg: The Victims of a Growing Mental Disorder are Obsessed with 
Amputation, (August 11, 2004) available at http://slate.msn.com/id/2085402/ (last visited June 30, 2006). 
292 People v. Brown, 91 Cal.App.4th 256, 259 (2001) (finding the defendant guilty of murder for 
amputating a perfectly healthy limb of an apotemnophile in Mexico who later died of gangrene). 
 
293 Gerard Seenan, Healthy Limbs Cut Off at Patients Request, (February 1, 2000) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,237010,00.html (last visited June 30, 2006). (If this is 
eventually allowed, where do we draw the line?  Only one limb per customer?  Or one arm and one leg 
only?  Or could modern medicine potentially allow one to define his or her own existence by removing all 
their limbs and  becoming a stump if they realized their “true” existence was a stump trapped in a healthy 
person’s body? What if a self-inflicted amputee develops a tattoo or piercing  syndrome (where you can 
never have just one) and finds a surgeon to have the second or third limb removed?). 
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or physically.294 He states that when a person is running around convinced they want their 
leg (or anything else) chopped off, they are hardly competent to make life-altering 
decisions.295 
The emergence of apotemnophilia creates one of the strongest arguments against 
allowing SRS. Indeed, the fact that most practitioners and wannabes argue 
apotemnophilia is no different than GID and amputation is like SRS 296 “undermines the 
uniqueness of sex-change surgery and challenges the social value attributed to it”.297 One 
sufferer of apotemnophilia explains that the desire to remove the limb becomes 
uncontrollable and the realization of the limb’s removal “has become indispensable for 
my happiness and peace of mind”.298  This is the same basic reason given by transsexuals 
who desire to “change” their sex by mutilating their bodies.299  One man who suffered 
from an amputee fetish severed his penis with a tourniquet, catheter and razor blade 
following instructions obtained from the internet. He later questioned why he had wanted 
to do this to himself in the first place.300 He became even more depressed after the 
amputation than he was to begin with and cried when he spoke of what he had done.301 
294 Randy Dotinga, Out on a Limb, Salon.com (Aug. 29, 2000) available at 
http://dir.salon.com/health/feature/2000/08/29/amputation/index.html (last visited June 30, 2006). 
295 Id.
296 Everaerd, A Case of Apotemnophilia: A Handicap as a Sexual Preference, 37 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 
at 286 (quoting a patient, “Just as a transsexual is not happy with his own body but longs to have the body 
of another sex, in the same way I am not happy with my present body, but long for a peg leg”). 
297 John Leo, The Sex-Change Boom, 130 No. 10 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, at 20 (March 12, 2001).  
298 Everaerd, A Case of Apotemnophilia: A Handicap as a Sexual Preference, 37 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 
at 288-89. 
299 “It is not obvious how this patient’s feeling that he is a woman trapped in a man’s body differs from a 
feeling of a patient with anorexia nervosa that she is obese despite her emaciated, cachectic state. We don’t 
do liposuction on anorexics. Why amputate these poor men’s genitals? Surely the fault is in the mind, not 
the member.” McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures at 193-94. 
300 Thomas M. Wise and Ram Chandran Kalyanam, Amputee Fetishism and Genital Mutilation: Case 
Report and Literature Review, 26 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 339, 341 (2000). 
301 Id. 
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 The man who severed his penis was lucky compared to the man who made the 
only reported case to date in this country dealing with apotemnophilia.302 The latter did 
not live to shed tears about his decision.  Gregg Furth and Philip Bondy, sufferers of 
apotemnophilia, each made an appointment to have a leg amputated with an underground 
surgeon in San Diego known unaffectionately among the transsexual crowd as “Butcher 
Brown”.  Dr. John Ronald Brown agreed to the operations as long as they were 
performed in Mexico.  Although Mr. Furth eventually backed out of the operation after 
seeing an assistant with a large knife, Philip Bondy, a 79-year-old man, decided to go 
through with the leg amputation.  Bondy returned to California minus one leg and 
checked into a motel where he died shortly thereafter of gas gangrene. At the trial, Dr. 
Brown was found guilty of unlawful practice of medicine and convicted of second degree 
murder.303 The appellate court affirmed the decision.304 
Regrettable trends in the psychiatric field such as transsexualism and 
apotemnophilia are not uncommon. The reality of performing these mutilating surgeries 
“did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments” on this mental 
illness.305 When it follows cultural fashion, the practice of psychiatry can result in “false, 
even disastrous, consequences.”306 There have been huge glitches in psychiatric history 
that provide evidence as to why psychiatry should not follow cultural trends. With respect 
to transsexualism and apotemnophilia, history is repeating the blunder culturally 
 
302 See People v. Brown, 91 Cal.App.4th 256 (2001). 
303 Id at 259. 
304 Id. at 268. 
305 See McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures at 194. “The zeal for this sex-change surgery – perhaps, with 
the exception of frontal lobotomy, the most radical therapy ever encouraged by twentieth century 
psychiatrists – did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments.” Id. 
306 Id. at 188. When a new hysteria arises in popular culture such as the need to release schizophrenics from 
the oppression of hospitals and free them from psychiatry altogether so they could live their “alternative” 
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motivated psychiatric fads had on schizophrenics.307 When the “anti-psychiatrists” 
convinced the government and society that the schizophrenics were simply 
misunderstood beings living an alternative lifestyle that needed to escape the oppressive 
bounds of mental hospitals, they did so under a guise of freedom. They had to convince 
others it was the social custom that was oppressive. In other words, the schizophrenics 
were fine. The culture merely needed to accept their alternate lifestyles. Some argued that 
schizophrenics were created by outdated and nonprogressive cultural norms.308 Contrary 
to what those advocating “freedom” predicted, the mentally ill did not function in society; 
they suffered greatly as a result of this innovative idea.309 It became evident that 
schizophrenics really were sick and incapable of functioning in society after most of them 
ended up homeless.  Similarly, there are contemporary efforts to declassify 
transsexualism as a mental disorder and to transform society into acceptance rather than 
treating the disorder.310 
According to one medical ethicist, if the apotemnophiliac movement were to 
become accepted, as its sister disorder transsexualism is becoming, the law would in fact 
view voluntary amputation the same as some advocates want the law to view SRS.311 
Professor Mason opined that  “as long as you say that people can have a sex change for 
 
lifestyles in the 60’s or the therapy-induced “remembrance” of sexual abuse that allegedly caused so many 
cases of Multiple Personality Disorder in the 90’s, disaster has inevitably followed. See id. at 187-202. 
307 See id. at 187-202. “This interrelationship of cultural antinomianism and a psychiatric misplaced 
emphasis is seen at its grimmest in the practice known as sex reassignment surgery.” Id. at 192. 
308 Id. at 187-91. 
309 Id. at 498-99. 
310 Lynne Carroll, Counseling Transgendered, Transsexual and Gender Variant Clients, 80 J. COUNS. &
DEV. 134 (2002) (“We believe clinicians need to rethink their assumptions about gender, sexuality, and 
sexual orientation and to adopt a “trans-positive” or “trans-affirmative” disposition to counseling. A trans-
affirmative approach necessitates that counselors affirm transgendered persons; advocate for political, 
social, economic rights for the transgendered; and educate others about such issues”). 
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what is a severe psychological disease then it is difficult to say you cannot have an 
amputation for this form of severe psychological disease.”312 Conferring legal status upon 
transsexuals opens a Pandora’s box which will undermine not only equal protection, but 
objective law itself. 
CONCLUSION 
 From founding of the country to the present, the public policy, as reflected in the 
common and statutory law, recognizes marriage exclusively between one man and one 
woman.  For purposes of marriage, sex has always been assumed to be binary – male and 
female.  Sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic. However, some transsexual 
advocates argue that sex should not be considered static. They argue that sex should not 
be determined by objective factors such as biology or physiology but by subjective 
mental desires.  This line of reasoning is fraught with problems. 
 If sex is primarily a state of mind which is subject to change over time, then equal 
protection for sex-based classifications becomes meaningless. To have any meaning at 
all, sex must continue to be immutable under the law. Sex must be determined by 
objective factors based on biology and physiology.  While plastic surgery may alter a 
person’s physical appearance, it does not change a person’s birth sex.  SRS is 
controversial and cannot be the bright line determinate of a person’s sex.  If sex were 
determined primarily by subjective mental musings, then an argument could be made that  
SRS is not necessary.  What should the law do with a transsexual who, after undergoing 
SRS, decides to revert back to the original birth sex?  Moreover, what should the law do 
with a person suffering from GID when the desire to be the opposite sex remits or 
 
311 See Seenan, Healthy Limbs Cut Off at Patient’s Request, (February 1, 2000) available at 
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disappears?  If the law recognized that sex is subjective, a person could be born one sex, 
later acknowledged by the law to become another, and then again later determined by law 
to revert to the original sex.  Such a result is absolutely absurd.  Sex can, and must, be 
determined by objective biological and physiological factors.  The law cannot base a 
person’s sex upon subjective mental thoughts. 
 
APPENDIX A 
Intersex Conditions
Disorder Chromosomes Features Sex Testing 
Androgen 
Insensitivity 
Syndrome 
XY Lacks the androgen 
receptor gene, so develops 
as a female may or may 
not have testes 
Female PCR test will 
discover a 
lack of SRY 
gene or a 
mutation of 
it 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,237010,00.html (last visited June 30, 2006).
312 Id.
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Partial Androgen 
Insensitivity 
Syndrome 
XY Androgen receptor there, 
but doesn’t function 
properly ambiguous 
genitalia 
Probably 
female but 
depends 
PCR test 
Congenital 
Adrenal 
Hyperplasia 
 
*Progestin 
Induced 
Virilization has 
similar effects, 
but was caused 
by the drug 
progestin, 
administered in 
the 50s and 60s 
to prevent 
miscarriage - no 
longer used 
XX Blockage in adrenal 
pathway causing 
overproduction of 
androgen masculinization 
of a female child in utero 
ambiguous genitalia 
Sometimes 
genitalia 
appear more 
male, 
sometimes 
not- 
depends 
PCR test on 
X
chromosome 
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Gonadal 
dysgenesis  
XY Have mutations or 
deletions of the SRY 
gene, born as normal 
females but do not have 
secondary sex 
characteristics, do not 
menstruate 
Female PCR test 
Mosaicism XY/XX Some cells contain XY 
chromosomes and some 
cells contain XX 
chromosomes, results in 
ambiguous genitalia 
? Peripheral 
blood 
karyotyping, 
testicular 
biopsy with 
karyotyping. 
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Sex Chromosome Aneuploidies
Disorder Chromosomes Features Sex Testing 
Klinefelter’s 
Syndrome 
XXY Overwhelmingly male, 
though most of the time 
sterile and there may be 
some female breast 
development.  Many 
men with KS are never 
diagnosed . 
Male Blood 
karyotyping to 
detect the extra 
X chromosome 
Turner’s 
Syndrome 
XO Female, sometimes have 
a webbed neck, 
generally will not 
develop breasts or grow 
to normal height unless 
given hormone therapy, 
infertility but can carry a 
child 
Female Blood 
karyotyping to 
detect lack of 
second X 
chromosome 
Triple X XXX Sometimes lower 
intelligence 
Female Blood 
karyotyping 
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 XYY Above average height, 
sometimes lower 
intelligence 
Male Blood 
karyotyping 
Other 
Neither intersex nor aneuploidies, but some have erroneously categorized as intersex. 
 
Disorder Chromosome Features Sex Testing 
Late Onset 
Congenital 
Adrenal 
Hyperplasia 
Can happen 
either to XY or 
XX 
Normal XY males at 
birth - main symptom 
is scalp hair thinning 
 
Normal XX female at 
birth - symptoms can 
be infertility, acne, 
sometimes mild 
clitoromegaly 
(enlarging of clitoris), 
but many affected are 
asymptomatic  
XY- male 
XX-female 
PCR test on X 
chromosome 
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Vaginal 
Agenesis 
XX Normal ovaries, 
uterus, but third 
portion of vagina 
failed to develop and 
was replaced by 
fibrous tissue.  Is 
corrected by surgery. 
Female Physical exam 
Hypospadias XY Urethra located at 
base of penis, some 
have chordee 
(bending of penis 
with erection) 
Male Physical exam 
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